Proposal for a Paradigm Shift in U.S. Policy Toward North Korea

Chaesung Chun: Professor Cha, thank you for joining us. You've made tremendous contributions to the study of Korean affairs and to strengthening the U.S.-ROK alliance so far, shaping both academic and policy debates over many years. Now, your recent article in Foreign Affairs has drawn a lot of attention here, because it suggests what looks like a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward North Korea. So our audience is very interested in hearing directly from you about your thinking, the new paradigm, and what it means going forward. But can you first just give us a summary of your view, please?

Victor Cha: Sure, professor Chun. I'm happy to be on this interview with you. So in a nutshell, the idea is essentially that by the measurement of where North Korea is today in terms of their nuclear weapons program, that is probably 50 nuclear warheads and enough fissile material for maybe 50 more. The sum and the variety of delivery vehicles and their stated goal to mass produce nuclear weapons. Our denuclearization policy, and by “our” I mean the United States, South Korea, Japan, and even to an extent China and Russia, has failed. We have not been able to denuclearize North Korea. We've been able to maybe slow the growth of the process.

But it has now reached the point where they are a small nuclear weapon state with, I believe, aspirations to become a nuclear weapons power the size of France or Britain, or even larger than France or Britain. So in that sense, our focus on denuclearization as a singular objective has not worked. And so we need to adjust. We need to think of some other sorts of policies. My argument is not to abandon denuclearization because I don't think the United States should ever abandon denuclearization. But we should not let the goal of denuclearization stand in the way of intermediate steps and negotiations that are designed to reduce the threat to the United States, that is designed to reduce the number of enemies that the United States is dealing with these days.

That is designed to prevent the potential for nuclear crisis and nuclear first-use and that is designed to somehow sever or cut the Russia-North Korea tie. These, to me, are the most immediate threats to the United States from North Korea's nuclear program. And my main point is to focus only on denuclearization at the expense of these other things would be a mistake and would be detrimental to the security of the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

The New Strategic Environment and Policy Feasibility

Chaesung Chun: Thinking of the alliance, Trump 2.0 administration's foreign policy, there are so many issues that the United States should deal with right now. So I wonder whether your proposal reflects any realistic adjustment to the current strategic environment, given the crowded set of crises facing the current U.S. administration, it seems you're trying to offer a way to keep North Korea on the policy agenda rather than letting it be crowded out. So, by a more realistic interim proposal, U.S. government may think that North Korea is still on the agenda. Do you think it's a fair way to put it?

Victor Cha: I think what motivated me to write it at that particular time is that even though North Korea has not been on the mainstream policy agenda for the United States because of Ukraine, because of Iran, because of Gaza, because of Venezuela and a number of other issues, even though it wasn't in the mainstream, it always has the potential to arise and become a front burner issue, either due to things that North Korea does, like a seventh nuclear test, more long-range testing, or because Trump wants to make it an issue. He wants it because he wants to meet Kim Jong Un. President Trump wants to meet Kim Jong Un again.

And so part of the timing of the piece was because it was in the run up to President Trump's trip to the region where there might have been a possibility of an encounter with the North Korean leader. And in that respect, it would be important to think about under what terms should the United States re -engage with North Korea. So I agree with the question in the sense that this has not been a top policy agenda item, but it always has the potential to become one suddenly, unexpectedly, and I don't think that there is a lot of thinking in an organized way happening within the U.S. government today on North Korea because everybody defers to the president because this is really the president's issue and only he can speak or think about policies on it. So I just tried to think from the outside of a way to reset North Korea policy, reset our objectives, starting with resetting our objectives and then determining what we should be negotiating on going forward.

Policy Debates and Criticism Within the U.S., and Negotiation Strategies

Chaesung Chun: You've been a leading scholar and analyst on Korean affairs. I wonder if this type of proposal, the interim approach, is widely shared among the U.S. policy community, or is there any possibility, as you said, President Trump will not read, but will think in this way, if President Trump has a chance to meet Kim Jong Un?

Victor Cha: Well, I'm not expecting that President Trump will read the article because I understand he's not big on reading, but perhaps people around him will read it and will talk to him about it. I know that it has been sent to people close to him. So in terms of the Washington, D.C. policy community, it has sparked a good bit of debate and discussion within the D.C. policy community. I will say that when I wrote the piece in draft form, I sent it to a number of people who were former negotiators on this issue for both Democrat and Republican administrations.

And, you know, they might have had individual quibbles with one thing or the other thing, but they all generally agreed with the gist of the argument and thought it was good that somebody was making this argument. Because I think, in my opinion, I think it's an argument that that anybody who has been put in the position of negotiating with North Korea on denuclearization would understand very well. But at the same time, it's taboo to say we should put denuclearization on the side for the moment. And so that's the thing I've been most criticized from is people who don't read the argument basically just have a caricature of it.

And they say, “Oh, he's saying, accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state and give up on denuclearization.” And people have criticized the article for that. Of course, that's not what I'm saying. If people read the article, what I'm saying is that we should still focus on denuclearization as a long-term goal, but we need to accomplish certain objectives in the meantime for the security interests of the United States and its allies. So yes, it sparked a good deal of discussion. I think for those who have actually negotiated with North Korea, I have not heard a lot of disagreement. But from people outside of that circle, and people who make generalizations about the argument, there's been criticism.

Chaesung Chun: Let me list some details of your proposal then. As far as I read, your proposal is composed of several pillars, such as the defense of the Homeland Security, which becomes, you know, harder, thinking of the limit of the GDI, the transfer denial, and also the need to open a channel with North Korea, a diplomatic channel for the crisis management, under the big paradigm of arms control and also strengthening U.S., South Korea, Japan's trilateral defense system and possibly driving a wedge among the three countries, Russia, China, and North Korea, all seem very reasonable.

The Prospects for U.S.-North Korea and Inter-Korean Dialogue and the Paradigm for Peace on the Korean Peninsula

Chaesung Chun: The question then is, will North Korea come to the table for the preparedness of crisis management with the U.S. because North Korea thinks that they are in the best strategic position, maybe after 1945, because in terms of level of nuclear arms and the level of support from Russia and the recovery of trade with China, even though there is big problem of North Korean economy, but in their constitution, they explicitly stated that they should be recognized as a legal nuclear weapon state, which is a presupposition for the opening in negotiation with the United States. So it seems really reasonable and ideal that we should open a channel for crisis management for any possible nuclear war.

Is there any policy means of leverage for the [United] States to make North Korea to come to the table?

Victor Cha: Well, I mean, it's important to remember that when we led with denuclearization, we would not allow ourselves to have a conversation about crisis management with North Korea. We would not allow ourselves to have a conversation about preventing crisis escalation to the nuclear level. Largely because, if we did that, we would fall into this rabbit hole of basically accepting North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. And so we would not have that conversation. But the reality today is they have 50 nuclear weapons with delivery systems, if not more. And they have explicitly disavowed a no first-use doctrine, following Russia's lead. And so the danger of nuclear escalation is real.

I mean, in the early 1990s, when they had maybe one or two crude bombs, it wasn't real. But the danger of nuclear escalation is real now. And so it is only responsible to have some sort of conversation with them about managing nuclear escalation, about nuclear deterrence. That seems to be the very pragmatic and practical thing to do, while at the same time still saying our goal is denuclearization.

And I think what my article was trying to say is that we don't have to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state And we can still have negotiation/dialogue with them on the issues having to do with two countries contending with each other that both have nuclear weapons, why would North Korea be interested in any sort of conversation of this nature? I think there are two reasons. First, I think that they are quite attuned to concerns about crisis escalation, and one recent piece of evidence is their actual response to South Korea when the South Korean government said it expressed regret with regard to drone activity from South Korea going into North Korea. Now, one could argue there are many reasons why the South Korean government did that.

But the North Korean government, which had previously disavowed any communication with South Korea, acknowledged the statement by the South, which to me is a sign that there are interested or they are concerned about crisis escalation when it comes to drones. As you know well, Professor Chun, in the comprehensive inter-Korean military agreement, there was actually nothing with regard to drone activity in that. So the fact that they responded to the South was maybe a sign that they understand and they are concerned about crisis escalation. The second thing I think that might bring them to the table is the fact that, and I think I'm going to eventually try to write something on this.

I think it's a mistake to assume that, I agree with you that North Korea is in the best position it's been since 1945, arguably. But it's a mistake to assume that they are status quo oriented. In other words, people assume that because they have support from Russia because they have support from China, they don't really need anything else. They don't need to talk to the United States. Many people say that Trump may want to talk to Kim, but Kim has no need to because he has China and Russia. And that is assuming a status quo mindset on the part of North Korea. but I don't think their mindset is status quo. I think their mindset is revisionist, and they will always try to do more. And so that might be another reason they'd actually be willing to come to the table with the United States. Because they know that Donald Trump says many things.

On the one hand, he may say denuclearization. On the other hand, he may say Kim has nuclear weapons. He's a nuclear power. And so I think from a North Korean perspective, reentering a negotiation with the United States would be for the purpose of trying to get de facto recognition as a nuclear weapon state. Again, that is one of their goals. And if they're revisionist oriented and they see an opportunity because they see a U.S. president that wants to meet that doesn't really focus on denuclearization the way previous presidents have, they may see an opportunity there. And so I think there are different types of reasons why North Korea might be willing to come back to the table. Again, the general view is they have Russia, they have China. The last time they met with Trump, it was a disaster. Why would they want to meet again?

But it's precisely because Kim is in a much stronger position now and that he's not status quo oriented. He might see an opportunity to meet with Trump, make some sort of meaningless agreement and be able to walk away saying that “I met with the U.S. president and they've accepted me as a nuclear weapons state.”

Chaesung Chun: Let me ask from the South Korean perspective. Even though there is a good discussion between the U.S. and North Korea, first there is a worry in South Korea that South Korea might be sidelined in that discussion. Because North Korea doesn't want to deal with South Korea these days, you know the theorem of hostile two nation states, so they want to be recognized as a nation state. Meaning that South Korea is a foreign country, a very hostile foreign country. So, the progressive government is trying to have, like you said, an interim phase in which South Korea might have a chance to open a dialogue panel with North Korea, but it seems very difficult.

So, for the time being, our government proposed the idea that peaceful coexistence, even though unification is a distant subject, like denuclearization. So unification is in the back burner, but at the front line, we will emphasize peaceful coexistence. So here, peace is also, in Johan Galtung's terminology, is a “negative peace,” very passive peace, just preventing any military conflict, seems like there is a commonality between “Cold Peace.” So can you find some common ground between Cold Peace approach and South Korea's peaceful coexistence approach?

Victor Cha: I think so. I mean, I think there could be some parallels there. I do think that North Korea's goal, as your question suggests, is really to free South Korea out. So I do think that even if they were willing and interested to engage with Donald Trump again, it wouldn't be the same way that it happened during the Moon Jae In government, where the Moon Jae In government pushed for a role, met with North Korea first bilaterally. They did a trilateral meeting at Panmunjom. I don't think that the North Korean side is interested in that at all. In fact, I think they would see it as a victory to meet with the United States without consulting with South Korea at all. And I think actually President Trump might also feel like he doesn't need South Korea. The first time around he did, he needed South Korea, he needed China to help make these things happen.

But I think he probably thinks he doesn't need that this time. So I think that, while there may be parallels between “Cold Peace” and “Peaceful Coexistence,” I think that the North Korean strategy is really to choose to sort of step out of the shadows and re-engage in diplomacy, I think it will entirely be focused on the United States. I do think the other, two other quick points. The first is that I see “Cold Peace” as an idea that the relationship is still somewhat adversarial. And we still don't like their nuclear weapons. We see them as a threat and we want denuclearization eventually.

What we're after, but at the same time, we need to maintain open channels of communication to avoid escalation of a crisis or anything of that nature. Whereas peaceful coexistence, I think, at least as put forward by the Lee government, has a little bit more of a benign flavor to it. I'm not saying that Cold Peace is malign. But I think it is what it is. It's a Cold Peace between two enemies that are basically trying to ensure that there is no miscalculation or escalation. The second point I would make is that while I think North Korea's goal is, or part of their goal is, to freeze out South Korea in any sort of conversation with the United States, I think China's role is actually different than it was in the first Trump administration.

I think in the first Trump administration, China looked with trepidation on the U.S.-North Korea meetings/summits. As you know well, prior to Trump's announcement that he would meet Kim in Singapore, Xi Jinping refused to meet with Kim Jong Un. But after Trump announced he would meet with Kim Jong Un, Xi Jinping met with Kim Jong Un five or six times, something along that lines. And then when the last summit failed in Hanoi, Xi Jinping really stopped meeting with Kim Jong Un. So earlier this year, when Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping met, both in China and in North Korea, this was really the first set of meetings since Hanoi.

So I think traditionally, certainly China looks with trepidation on any time the U.S. and North Korea meet, but I actually think the constellation of forces today make it such that China might actually welcome and might actually try to facilitate a U.S. North Korea meeting. in large part because if they were able to help facilitate a meeting or at least convey to Kim Jong Un that Trump wants to meet and the meeting takes place, China would say, tell Trump he did a big favor for them and that they would want something in return. Also, and perhaps more importantly, I think that China would be in favor of the U.S. and North Korea meeting today because anything that can distract or dilute the relationship between Kim and Putin would be, I think, seen by China as a good thing right now.

So I think both the Chinese and North Korean positions in a potential U.S.-North Korea meeting have changed quite a bit from the first Trump administration.

Changes in the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Military Deterrence Strategies

Chaesung Chun: I think the kind of point is something that we have to think more. That's a very good point. This question is about the military component of the Cold Peace paradigm. There are some, you know, analysts in South Korea that you mentioned some USFK changes in a more efficient way. I agree with you that by having more robust deterrence against North Korea to protect the U.S. mainland by having more deterrence by denial or by retaliation, there is less chance for decoupling between U.S. and ROK. So that's a good thing. But it might have some maybe misunderstood signal in South Korea that in the assurance game, there might be some less commitment from U.S. to South Korea. You know, you mentioned about Kill-Chain elements, retargeting of USFK in a more effective way by using new technology. So can you do something to reassure U.S. commitment in this Cold Peace paradigm?

Victor Cha: So, I think that the United States, certainly under the Trump administration, and we've heard Secretary Hegseth say this a number of times, really is seeing South Korea shifting the majority of the burden of defense of the Korean Peninsula to South Korea. That is certainly the track that this current administration is on. And so I think that the Cold Peace idea, I think, it assumes that is the way that the United States is looking at it. But at the same time, it tries to do two things. One is to avoid any sort of threat of preemptive action that could trigger North Korea preemptive action, right? So any threat of South Korean preemptive action that could then trigger North Korean preemptive action.

And the North Korean preemptive action, at least according to what they say, may not be conventional. It could be nuclear in a sort of use-it-or-lose-it scenario. So in that sense, I think, as you said, that there are ways to shore up deterrence that do not necessarily focus on Kill-Chain or decapitation, which I think potentially, you know, objectively speaking, I know are quite potentially destabilizing on the peninsula. I certainly understand why South Korea, the South Korean government may like Kill-Chain and decapitation strikes to try to reinforce deterrence to show massive action. But they've also said it's not retaliation, it could be preemptive. And so I think that's sort of the danger of escalation.

You can certainly talk about decapitation strikes and massive punishment in the form of retaliation, which is stabilizing, right? That is stabilizing for deterrence. The other thing is, I think that it's certainly entirely possible that the U.S. presence on the ground, traditional ground troop presence on the Korean peninsula could change with the potential for OPCON transition happening and with the U.S. focus on Taiwan contingency in particular, which could mean more air and naval on the Korean Peninsula and less ground troops. But I think I say in the article that there still needs to be some sort of tripwire presence by the United States because the troop presence is still very much a part of the credibility of deterrence and nuclear deterrence.

So, you know, the United States should be enhancing capabilities of South Korea, enhancing trilateral capabilities with Japan and South Korea. It should be maintaining at least a tripwire presence, even if it changes the composition of ground troops on the peninsula and moves more to an air and naval force. And at least in my opinion, they should be working with South Korea more on deterrence by denial, massive retaliation, rather than focusing on preemptive strikes or preemptive decapitation.

Chaesung Chun: Let me just talk a couple more broader questions. In South Korea, there is a big discussion about ROK-U.S. relations these days. It involves, as you said, OPCON transfer, strategic flexibility of USFK, investment to the United States, all those things, you know, the submarine, all those things. So, as you 0.know, we've been in the relations for many decades. How do you assess the current status of the U.S.-ROK strategy and consultation on not just North Korea, on general things, the status of the alliance? So are we having sufficiently deep and candid discussions about how to deal with these new challenges?

Victor Cha: So when I look at the joint fact sheet and the trade and investment framework agreement reached between the Trump administration and the Lee government, undeniably, it's been a very rocky road, more like a roller coaster going up and down crises and then agreements and then more crises. But if you look at actually what is to be accomplished in those documents, they are potentially transformational for the U.S.-Korea relationship, potentially transformational. Whether you're talking about OPCON transition, South Korean investments in critical industries in the United States, civil nuclear energy cooperation, as you said, shipbuilding, nuclear submarines.

This could truly be a very different looking alliance if all of these things are accomplished. The challenge, of course, is trying to accomplish all of these things because they are big, they are unconventional, and anytime you talk about something unconventional in policy, it's very hard to get it implemented. So I would say that there is great potential for major transformation in a way that benefits both sides. I think it really does benefit both sides. But it's not easy. It's not easy to do. And then in the meantime, you know, I mean, we have good people like on the U.S. side, like Alison Hooker and her counterpart at a very high level that are trying to get these working groups started for the joint fact sheet and moving the implementation forward. That's all good.

But at the same time, there are irritants in the relationship, in particular related to some of the business disputes, the coupon data breach, obviously being one of these, that has really had a disproportionate effect on the relationship right now. And that has certainly slowed things down.

Future Research Directions, Artificial Intelligence, and North Korea-Russia Relations

Chaesung Chun: Let me close by asking one question. After you have researched about South Korea and Japan's willingness to go nuclear, and then you researched about the collective resilience vis-a-vis China as a country portion, and now the new paradigm towards North Korea. So, when I read your article, can we work on the post-interim stage toward denuclearization? Can we find the long-term roadmap from now on to the denuclearization and hopefully better relations between two Koreas? So, including that, do you have any future plan for your research related to the policy agenda? or South Korea?

Victor Cha: Yes, I mean, so one of the projects that we're just now starting at CSIS really is looking at the resiliency of autocratic alliances. So, you know, what are the factors that allow autocratic alliances from being highly personal, short-term, and transactional? To becoming much more embedded, institutional and longer term strategic relationships. And obviously this is with reference to North Korea and Russia and what will happen to this relationship if there ever is an end to the war in Ukraine. So it's something that is theoretical and also historically focused, looking at the history of autocratic alliances and trying to induce what are the conditions that allow autocratic alliances to be more long-term and strategic.

I think that relates to the Cold Peace argument because, as I said, one of the objectives of the Cold Peace argument in engaging with North Korea is to try to somehow reduce, dilute the relationship between Russia and North Korea because that poses problems for the United States, on the Korean Peninsula, in the region more generally, if we're talking about North Korean nuclear submarines, and then of course in Europe as well, if North Korea is helping Russia, not just in Ukraine, but potentially in other places. Trying to understand what are the weak points, the vulnerabilities, what are the strengths of this particular new autocratic alliance, it relates to the Cold Peace.

Chaesung Chun: Thank you very much. ■ 

■ Victor CHA is Korea Chair at the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), and Professor at Georgetown University.

■ Translated and edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate; Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Sowon KIM, EAI Intern.
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