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The Iran War and CRINK, Why They Must Be Viewed Together

The Iran War, which began with a surprise U.S.–Israeli airstrike (Operation Epic Fury) on February 28, 2026, may appear, on the surface, to be confined to the Middle East. However, its strategic significance extends well beyond that region. The Iran War possesses the character of ‘multi-regional strategic interconnectedness,’ in that it amplifies the structure of U.S.–China strategic competition, shakes the threat perceptions and postures of allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific, and compels China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) to recalibrate their responses.

Although CRINK is neither an exclusive bloc nor an alliance, its members share a common grievance that the principles, rules, and institutions of the existing order impede their interests,[1] and the Iran War thus functions as a catalyst that strengthens strategic solidarity among CRINK members. In particular, given that CRINK exhibits strong characteristics of a ‘functional wartime alignment’[2]—one whose cohesion is triggered and intensified under conditions of war—the claims of revisionist states for a multipolar order arising from the Iran War are becoming even more visible as the international structure changes. Building on this structural shift, the CRINK states are developing their loose strategic alignment into strategic solidarity through a discourse of multipolarism and anti-hegemonism centered on China, and North Korea is strategically leveraging this change to justify and reinforce its ‘nuclear-state status’ and the theory of ‘two hostile states.’

Accordingly, North Korea–Russia military cooperation, Iran–Russia drone cooperation, and the new North Korea–China strategic coordination should not be understood as separate, individual instances of cooperation; rather, they should be seen as a single current in which these interconnected efforts are advancing toward strategic solidarity under the common norm of anti-hegemonism. Moreover, because North Korea is dissolving the fait accompli of hostile two-state relations and nuclear possession into a discourse of anti-Americanism, anti-hegemonism, and anti-militarism, the issues of North Korea’s denuclearization and stability on the Korean Peninsula can be seen as operating in connection with the change in CRINK’s structure.

Structural Change and the Iran War

The driving force behind CRINK’s cohesion is ‘structure.’ The transition from unipolarity to multipolarity satisfies the respective interests of all four countries.

For China, multipolarization signifies the weakening of the U.S.-led unipolar order, which legitimizes the discourse of ‘the greatest transformation in a century’ and the vision of a ‘community with a shared future for mankind.’ China utilizes CRINK as an ‘agency’ for realizing a world order of its own design, encouraging North Korea to pursue parallel nuclear and conventional development, as well as military modernization, so as to impose costs on the United States along an ‘eastern front.’ For Russia, multipolarization is the strategic environment itself that has enabled it to endure the prolongation of the war in Ukraine and Western sanctions. International sanctions proved powerless against North Korea’s provision of munitions and troops and Iran’s provision of drones, and multipolar discourse simultaneously provided justification for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and a rationale for anti-Western alignment. For Iran, multipolarization is a channel for regime survival and sanctions evasion. Through accession to the SCO and BRICS, Iran has secured diplomatic and economic outlets within multipolar institutions, while its asymmetric denial capability over the Strait of Hormuz has dispersed U.S. military and diplomatic resources, thereby easing the burden on the other CRINK states. For North Korea, multipolarization cements its ‘nuclear-armed state’ status as a fait accompli, provides a discourse that converts the theory of two hostile states into an ‘international and regional issue,’ and, through ‘asymmetric equidistance,’ expands its diplomatic space for hedging vis-à-vis China and Russia.

Thus, although the interests pursued by the four countries differ, their orientations converge in that all of them desire the structural change of ‘weakening the U.S.-led unipolar order.’ The scene at the September 2025 Beijing Victory Day military parade, in which Xi Jinping stood side by side with Putin and Kim Jong Un while the Iranian president stood behind them, can be regarded as a visual signal of this convergence.

Moreover, the very manner in which the Iran War will come to an end creates a structure favorable to CRINK. Regarding the termination of the Iran War, many experts identify a ‘Strategic Freeze’—a frozen conflict without a decisive victory—as the most realistic outcome, and name Russia and China as the greatest beneficiaries. This is because the United States’ expenditure of munitions needed for the Indo-Pacific and its continued entanglement in the Middle East both serve the interests of China and Russia. In addition, under the ‘Wild Card’ scenario—in which Iran effectively acquires nuclear weapons through the transfer of technology and arms from Russia and North Korea—the CRINK military-technology nexus becomes a threat[3] capable of fundamentally altering the regional balance, and thus a destabilizing factor not only for the Middle East but also for the Indo-Pacific and the Korean Peninsula. Accordingly, the Iran War is bringing about changes in the international structure in at least the following three respects.

The first is the amplification of the structure of U.S.–China strategic competition. The Iran War redirected U.S. strategic attention and resources from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East. Even though the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the second Trump administration explicitly prioritized the Indo-Pacific and specified a reduction in the weight given to the Middle East, the outbreak of the Iran War stood in direct contradiction to that strategy,[4] and the consumption of approximately 50 percent of key munitions, including THAAD and Patriot missiles, sounded a warning about gaps in preparedness for a high-intensity conflict with China.[5] China, by contrast, avoided direct intervention through ‘restrained observation’ and channeled its priorities toward ‘constructive strategic stability’ in U.S.–China relations.[6] Paradoxically, the more the United States intensified its confrontation with Iran, the more pressure on Russia eased, thereby accelerating the very China–Russia solidarity that the United States had sought to block.[7]

The second is the demonstration of ‘asymmetric leverage’ and the reassessment of North Korea’s strategic value. Iran’s greatest source of leverage proved to be not its nuclear and missile capabilities but its ability to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, and assessments suggested that one or two drones would suffice to disrupt passage.[8] Moreover, by selectively permitting passage only to vessels linked to friendly states, Iran set a precedent whereby access to a strategic chokepoint is governed not by an ‘open norm’ but by ‘political relations.’[9] This has prompted a reassessment of the strategic value of North Korea’s geopolitical position (the Tumen River corridor, the Rajin logistics axis, and its access to the East Sea). At the same time, the fact that Iran became the target of decapitation and preventive war has been interpreted by North Korea as a lesson in ‘vulnerability in the absence of nuclear deterrence,’ serving as a reference point for accelerating the pace of its parallel nuclear and conventional development.

The third is AI-driven warfare and the drone nexus. The Iran War demonstrated a ‘revolutionary compression of decision time’ through targeting that combined the Maven Smart System with large language models from the U.S. and Israel’s side. On the other hand, Iran countered with the sheer volume of its drones and missiles. This asymmetric configuration suggests that North Korea will seek to develop its deterrence and response strategies through an attrition-warfare approach based on increased production of drones and missiles. In addition, North Korea’s dispatch of more than 10,000 technical personnel to Russia also suggests that CRINK cohesion could develop into a ‘composite drone-cyber-missile nexus’ and expand into the military domain.

China’s Strategic Calculus and Its Transmission to the Korean Peninsula

1) China’s Sequential Summit Diplomacy and the Evaporation of ‘Denuclearization’

The reverberations of the Iran War became visible as diplomatic outcomes in a series of China-centered summits held in May–June 2026—U.S.–China (May), China–Russia (May), and North Korea–China (June). The U.S.–China summit adopted the outward form of ‘managed competition,’ but China announced that the United States had agreed to build a ‘constructive strategic stability relationship’ and that this would provide ‘strategic guidance’ for U.S.–China relations for more than the next three years.[10] Four days later, the joint statement of the China–Russia summit strongly criticized the U.S.–Israeli attack on Iran as a violation of international law, deliberately displaying a ‘difference in temperature’ from the preceding U.S.–China summit. Furthermore, they issued joint responses opposing the U.S. missile defense network (Golden Dome) and U.S.–Japan missile deployments targeting China, cautioned against Japan’s remilitarization, and opposed sanctions and pressure on North Korea.[11] Furthermore, at the North Korea–China summit (June 8–9)—Xi Jinping’s first overseas visit of the year and his first visit to Pyongyang in seven years—China’s position on a multipolar view of order became even more pronounced. In his article published in connection with the visit to Pyongyang, Xi Jinping omitted references to the ‘Korean Peninsula issue,’ ‘denuclearization,’ and ‘peaceful dialogue,’ repeating instead ‘strategic coordination,’ ‘opposition to hegemonism and power politics,’ and ‘the multipolarization of the world.’[12] Kim Jong Un, for his part, stated that he would ‘uphold the North Korea–China friendship as the foremost strategic task,’ expressing support for China’s ‘community with a shared future for mankind’ and its ‘four Global Initiatives.’[13] The problem is that, as shown in Table 1, China’s existing three principles toward the Korean Peninsula (denuclearization, peace and stability, and dialogue and negotiation) peaked in the May 2025 white paper and were thereafter progressively erased, with ‘multipolar order, strategic coordination, and anti-hegemonism’ rising in their place—amounting, in effect, to their dismantlement.[14] This is not a change in rhetoric but a reconfiguration of the very structure of China’s policy toward the Korean Peninsula, and should be regarded as a structural change that has already entered a stage of consolidation.

In particular, it is worth noting that China applied the concepts of the ‘community with a shared future for mankind’ and the ‘four Global Initiatives (GDI, GSI, GCI, and GGI)’ to the North Korea–China summit. This reflects a broader trend toward building a full-fledged multipolar order by combining a China-centered world order with the SCO, BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative.[15] The discourse of multipolarism and anti-hegemonism is developing both as an ideological adhesive binding together CRINK’s loose alignment and as a strategic language through which China incorporates North Korea, Russia, and Iran into an order it leads.

Table 1. The Progressive Erasure of ‘Denuclearization’ and the ‘Korean Peninsula Issue’ in Chinese Official Documents

 Source: Compiled by the author based on official Chinese documents and summit statements.

2) Transmission to the Korean Peninsula: The Theory of Two Hostile States and the Structural Transformation of North Korea–China Relations

The pursuit of multipolarization by the Iran War and CRINK has become linked to North Korea’s ‘theory of two hostile states,’ further reinforcing that logic. One day ahead of the North Korea–China summit, North Korea, through a statement by Kim Yo Jong, called for recognition of its nuclear-state status and the elimination of denuclearization discourse, and, through an announcement by the Vice Director of the Ministry of National Defense’s Equipment General Bureau, emphasized symmetric and asymmetric military measures under the pretext of U.S. arms sales to South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan.[16] In other words, North Korea is capitalizing on China’s ‘anti-hegemony, anti-Japanese militarism’ frame to convert its own nuclear-state status and the logic of two hostile states into an ‘international and regional issue between North Korea and China.’

As a result, three changes emerge with respect to the Korean Peninsula issue. First is the collapse of ‘functional separation.’ By erasing the three principles on the Korean Peninsula and denuclearization from North Korea–China relations, China has transformed North Korea’s nuclear status and its theory of two hostile states from a ‘cost’ of cooperation into an ‘asset.’ Second is ‘asymmetric equidistance.’ Kim Jong Un is expanding his diplomatic space between China and Russia, while China seeks to draw North Korea—which has tilted toward Russia—back into its own orbit. Third is ‘dual asymmetry.’ This refers to a condition in which two asymmetries running in different directions operate simultaneously and interlock on the Korean Peninsula. One is North Korea’s ‘asymmetric equidistance,’ a hedging strategy whereby North Korea, without becoming fully subordinate to either China or Russia, adjusts the distance between the two great powers to its own advantage and thereby expands its diplomatic space. The other is China’s ‘asymmetric leverage,’ whereby China, while bearing almost none of the direct costs, converts North Korea’s geopolitical value—its parallel nuclear and conventional development and nodal points such as the Tumen River corridor and access to the East Sea—into ‘a means of imposing costs on the United States.’ Insofar as North Korea’s existence and provocations tie down U.S. attention and resources on the ‘eastern front’ of the Indo-Pacific, this structure is one in which North Korea bears the burden while China collects the strategic dividend.

In other words, as North Korea builds up its strategic value between China and Russia, China seeks to use North Korea once again as a card for pressuring the United States, so that each becomes an important strategic card for the other. Moreover, the more the unstable termination of the Iran War ties the United States down in the Middle East, the greater the cost-imposition effect of the North Korea card on the eastern front becomes; the Iran War may thus become a variable that accelerates the dynamics of ‘dual asymmetry.’ In addition, North Korea’s theory of two hostile states also works in favor of advancing ‘new strategic coordination’ between North Korea and China. This is because North Korea’s policy of turning the Military Demarcation Line into a ‘border’ and replacing its ‘southern border firepower posture’ with new and upgraded weapons under the banner of ‘building the most powerful artillery force’[17] targets not only South Korea’s major military bases, airfields, ports, and power facilities, but also U.S. military bases in South Korea.

Assessment and Implications

The Iran War is not merely a localized conflict in the Middle East but a paradigmatic case of ‘multi-regional strategic interconnectedness’ linked to the Indo-Pacific and the Korean Peninsula, and its reverberations, mediated through China-centered multipolar diplomacy, have culminated in tacit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and CRINK cohesion. In particular, the erasure of the ‘denuclearization’ norm calls for a fundamental reexamination of the premises underlying South Korea’s foreign and security policy.

First, the utility of the argument for a Chinese role must be reassessed, and the argument itself redesigned accordingly. The argument for a Chinese role rested on the premise that China, sharing the goal of North Korea’s denuclearization, would cooperate in pressuring and mediating with North Korea. However, if this premise no longer holds, it is necessary to re-establish the principles of engagement with China and to redesign China policy accordingly.

Second, revisions are also needed in the direction, strategy, and approach of North Korea policy. Insofar as North Korea and China are attempting a structural shift toward multipolarism by substituting the ‘North Korean nuclear threat’ with the frame of ‘anti-Japan, anti-hegemonism, and regional stability,’ South Korea must adhere to the language of the denuclearization norm on the international stage and block the entrenchment of North Korea’s nuclear-armed status as a fait accompli. In particular, South Korea should proactively guard against the ‘revival of Japanese militarism’ frame being used to weaken South Korea–U.S.–Japan security cooperation, while demonstrating ‘strategic empathy’ toward the United States’ multi-regional crises, positioning itself as an ‘indispensable ally,’ and reinforcing confidence in extended deterrence.

Third, the response to CRINK must be refined. Without overestimating CRINK as a monolithic bloc, South Korea should work to weaken CRINK’s cohesion factors to the greatest extent possible. It should precisely identify ‘points of fracture’—such as North Korea’s wariness toward China, the uncertainty of its bandwagoning with Russia, and divergences of interest between China and Russia—and adopt a differentiated approach, while focusing on concrete nodal points such as North Korea–Russia military cooperation, the new North Korea–China strategic coordination, and the composite drone-cyber-missile nexus. In particular, the issue of North Korea, China, and Russia gaining access to the East Sea via the Tumen River bears directly on South Korea’s maritime and security interests and must therefore be carefully managed.  ■ 

[1] Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Richard Fontaine, “The Axis of Upheaval: How America’s Adversaries Are Uniting to Overturn the Global Order,” Foreign Affairs, April 23, 2024.

[2] Victoria Leukavets, “Cracking the CRINK: Belarus’s Relations with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea,” Policy Brief, March 31, 2026, tsikhanouskaya.org. Defines CRINK as a ‘functional wartime alignment.’

[3] Chase Metcalf & Michael Posey, “From Bargain to Breakdown: Five Strategic Futures for the Iran War,” Small Wars Journal, April 6, 2026.

[4] Jeffrey Taliaferro, “4 ways the war in Iran has weakened the US in the great power game,” Defense One, April 13, 2026.

[5] Mark F. Cancian & Chris H. Park, “Last Rounds? Status of Key Munitions at the Iran War Ceasefire,” CSIS, April 21, 2026; Seth G. Jones, “Is the United States Prepared for a War with China?” CSIS, May 12, 2026.

[6] Patricia M. Kim et al., “Beijing’s approach to the conflict in Iran and its implications for China,” Brookings, May 2026.

[7] Jordan Ryan, “Iran War Unravels U.S. Strategy and Strengthens Russia–China Axis,” Toda Peace Institute, March 24, 2026.

[8] Daniel Byman, “Iran’s Strait of Hormuz Gambit and the Limits of U.S. Military Power,” CSIS, April 20, 2026.

[9] Kari Heerman and David Wessel, “Chokepoints and coercion: Iran’s challenge to maritime openness,” Brookings, June 8, 2026.

[10] 《习近平同美国总统特朗普会谈》 [Xi Jinping Meets with U.S. President Trump], May 14, 2026. (www.mfa.gov.cn) Chinese-side statement on the U.S.–China summit.

[11] “Joint Statement between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Strengthening Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation and Deepening Good-Neighborly Friendly Cooperation,” May 21, 2026. (www.gov.cn)

[12] 《继往开来、砥砺同行 续写中朝传统友谊崭新篇章》 [Carrying Forward the Past and Forging Ahead Together to Write a New Chapter in the Traditional China–North Korea Friendship], Xinhua Net / Rodong Sinmun, June 8, 2026. (Xi Jinping’s article on the occasion of his visit to Pyongyang)

[13] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Kim Jong Un, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea and President of the State Affairs,” June 8, 2026; Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), June 9, 2026.

[14] Lee Ho-ryong, “The Strategic Implications of the 2026 North Korea–China Summit: The Evaporation of ‘Denuclearization’ and the Structural Transformation of North Korea–China Relations,” KIDA Security Strategy FOCUS, No. 26-41, June 25, 2026.

[15] Jung Jae-heung, “The 2026 Global Geopolitical Crisis and the Emergence of a New International Order: Focusing on China–Russia Strategic Cooperation,” Sejong Focus, March 4, 2026.

[16] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Statement by Kim Yo Jong and Announcement by the Vice Director of the Ministry of National Defense’s Equipment General Bureau, June 7, 2026.

[17] Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), June 26, 2026.

■ Ho Ryung LEE is a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) .

■ Translated and edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate; Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Sowon KIM, EAI Intern.
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