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Following President Trump’s reelection, expectations have persisted regarding the potential resumption of U.S.–DPRK summit diplomacy. Throughout the presidential campaign, President Donald Trump consistently expressed interest in meeting with Chairman Kim Jong Un, emphasizing his personal rapport with the North Korean leader and suggesting that Kim “misses” him. However, Kim firmly rejected the prospect of renewed talks, declaring that the DPRK had already “explored all possible avenues” with the United States and criticizing Washington’s continued “hostile policy” toward Pyongyang. Despite Kim’s refusal, Trump continued to signal openness to engagement. Ahead of his visits to the Republic of Korea for U.S.-ROK and U.S.-China summits, he once again conveyed willingness to meet Kim, stating that while no formal summit was planned, he would be “100 percent open” to the idea, citing his positive personal relationship with the DPRK leader. This posture appeared reminiscent of the sudden 2019 Panmunjom encounter, when a brief tweet message led to an unforeseen meeting between the two leaders.

Given the history of past interactions between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un, the prospect of an unexpected meeting would not be surprising. Considering Trump’s continued overtures, a summit could occur at any time should Kim decide to proceed. However, expectations for substantive progress from such an encounter would remain low. As demonstrated by the Panmunjom meeting—which yielded no tangible outcomes—an unprepared, ad hoc engagement between the two leaders is unlikely to produce meaningful results on denuclearization or the establishment of a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Ultimately, the initiative for resuming U.S.–DPRK summit diplomacy now rests in the hands of Kim.

Why Kim Met with Trump in Singapore

Kim Jong Un has met with Donald Trump on three occasions. The first historic U.S.–DPRK summit was held in Singapore in June 2018, followed by a second meeting in Hanoi, Vietnam, in February 2019. Later that year, in June 2019, the two leaders held an impromptu third encounter at Panmunjom, arranged on short notice at President Trump’s initiative. This raises an important question: What motivated Chairman Kim to hold the first-ever summit with a sitting U.S. president in Singapore?

One of the most significant factors motivating Chairman Kim’s decision to engage in the Singapore Summit was his growing confidence in North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, which he perceived as placing the DPRK in a position of strategic advantage. For decades, Pyongyang had pursued the development of nuclear weapons, and following the successful launch of the Hwasong-15—an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of reaching the eastern coast of the United States—it declared the completion of its “state nuclear force.” North Korea asserted that this achievement established a credible deterrent against U.S. threats and enabled the DPRK to safeguard peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond through what it described as a newly attained “strategic balance of power” with the United States.

North Korea has long adhered to the belief that nuclear deterrence is the ultimate guarantor of regime survival and national security, and it has persistently sought to establish its own deterrent against the United States. According to the logic of nuclear deterrence, mutual possession of nuclear weapons ensures the potential for mutual destruction, thereby discouraging preemptive or aggressive actions between nuclear-armed states. Pyongyang appeared to conclude that such a condition of “assured destruction” had effectively begun to apply to its relationship with Washington as of 2017.

Chairman Kim explicitly articulated this view, stating that “now that the DPRK’s capability to strike the very heart of the United States at any given time has been physically proved, the United States would find it more difficult to dare attack the DPRK.” Although the extent of North Korea’s actual technological readiness for a credible second-strike capability remains uncertain, Pyongyang nonetheless declared that it had achieved full nuclear deterrence. Kim further asserted that “even though the U.S. is wielding the nuclear stick and going wild for another war, it will not dare to invade us because we currently have a powerful nuclear deterrent.” Buoyed by this self-confidence in its perceived nuclear deterrent capability, North Korea announced a “new strategic line” during the plenary meeting of the Workers’ Party on April 20, 2018—just one week before the first inter-Korean summit in 11 years—signaling a shift in strategic focus from parallel nuclear and economic development (Byungjin) to a stronger emphasis on economic growth and diplomatic engagement.

Another key factor behind Kim policy shift was the emergence of Trump’s foreign policy doctrine grounded in the principle of “America First.” This approach signaled that U.S. foreign policy would prioritize American national interests above all else, regardless of the nature of existing relationships—whether with long-standing allies or traditional adversaries. Within this framework, President Trump frequently expressed skepticism toward established alliances and at times heightened tensions with both European and Asian partners, while simultaneously signaling openness to improved relations with Russia. In effect, the Trump administration pursued a foreign policy that diverged markedly from the strategic orientation of previous U.S. administrations.

President Trump appeared to pursue a retrenchment or quasi-isolationist strategy, which had the potential to significantly alter the security landscape of the Korean Peninsula. From Pyongyang’s perspective, this shift in U.S. foreign policy represented a favorable development that could improve North Korea’s strategic position. Trump’s approach suggested a reduced emphasis on traditional alliance commitments and a greater openness to bilateral, leader-driven diplomacy—conditions that aligned well with Kim’s diplomatic preferences.

Following his summit with Kim in Singapore, President Trump stated: “The past does not have to define the future. Yesterday’s conflict does not have to be tomorrow’s war. And as history has proven over and over again, adversaries can indeed become friends... Chairman Kim has before him an opportunity like no other: to be remembered as the leader who ushered in a glorious new era of security and prosperity for his people.” This rhetoric reflected Trump’s transactional and personalized diplomatic style, as well as his willingness to redefine the terms of U.S. engagement with North Korea.

Chairman Kim welcomed President Trump’s new foreign policy, expressing strong appreciation for what he characterized as Trump’s willingness and determination to address issues pragmatically through dialogue and negotiation, irrespective of the adversarial history between the two countries. In essence, Kim approached the Singapore summit with high confidence in North Korea’s nuclear deterrent capabilities and with expectations that he could secure strategic concessions from the United States regarding the Korean Peninsula. The Singapore Joint Statement reflected his perception that the diplomatic environment presented favorable conditions for the DPRK. It is therefore evident that Kim engaged in negotiations with the United States only when he believed the circumstances were advantageous to North Korea.

Why Kim Failed at Hanoi

Chairman Kim met with President Trump again in Hanoi, Vietnam, at the end of February 2019, with expectations of securing further concessions from the United States. However, the summit failed to produce any agreement. North Korea has long maintained the view that a comprehensive security guarantee and the establishment of a durable peace regime should precede denuclearization, operating on the premise that peace on the Korean Peninsula would create the conditions necessary for eventual denuclearization. Kim appeared to interpret the 2018 Singapore Joint Statement as reflecting this sequence and the “action-for-action” approach, noting that the agreement first emphasized U.S. commitments to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, followed by North Korea’s reaffirmation of its commitment to complete denuclearization.

A significant factor contributing to the failure of the Hanoi summit was a perception gap between Trump and Kim regarding the sequencing and scope of denuclearization measures. President Trump later noted that Kim appeared willing to address only issues that were of lesser importance to the United States. At Hanoi, Kim anticipated that the summit would produce U.S. agreement to a partial, phased approach to denuclearization, in which Pyongyang would take initial, limited steps while seeking relief from the most significant economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in 2016 and 2017, particularly in exchange for the dismantlement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. Kim framed these measures as the maximum concessions North Korea could realistically offer at that time. He rejected the U.S. proposal because it was based on a different negotiation framework—one demanding immediate, complete denuclearization. Kim’s strategy was to pursue a step-by-step approach, combining incremental denuclearization with parallel reciprocal actions by the United States. When the U.S. side insisted on a far more comprehensive deal than Kim expected or deemed feasible, negotiations broke down, resulting in the collapse of the Hanoi summit.

For Chairman Kim, complete denuclearization in exchange solely for the lifting of economic sanctions was unacceptable. Pyongyang sought comprehensive guarantees for the survival and security of the regime in return for full denuclearization, and therefore pursued a phased, step-by-step approach rather than a single, all-encompassing agreement. Given that North Korea’s primary security concern centers on the cessation of perceived U.S. hostile policies, Pyongyang has consistently aimed to influence and reshape Washington’s approach to the Korean Peninsula.

Following the failure of the Hanoi summit, Chairman Kim Jong Un later expressed regret regarding the outcome in his administrative policy speech. He stated: “The second North Korea–U.S. summit in Hanoi last February raised a strong question as to whether our strategic determination and courageous steps were the right ones. It was an opportunity to be wary of whether the United States has any genuine intention to improve relations between the two countries. However, the United States came to the summit thinking only about ways that were completely impossible to achieve.”

After Hanoi, Kim’s strategic perception appeared to revert to the pre-2018 posture. An intrinsic dilemma persists between denuclearization and the establishment of a durable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has consistently treated the denuclearization issue not as a unilateral North Korean problem, but as one affecting the broader peninsula and involving the United States. From Pyongyang’s perspective, it is U.S. policies that threaten peace on the Korean Peninsula, and North Korea’s nuclear capabilities have functioned as a deterrent to war. Accordingly, North Korea asserts that complete guarantees for the security of its regime must precede full denuclearization.

Ultimately, North Korea’s concept of denuclearization encompasses not only its own nuclear disarmament but also reciprocal steps by other nuclear powers, including the United States. In this framework, Pyongyang believes that meaningful denuclearization can only occur once hostile relations with the United States are fundamentally transformed and a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is established.

This represents the primary reason for the failure of the Hanoi summit. Pyongyang has consistently maintained that a comprehensive security guarantee and the establishment of a peace regime must precede any measures related to North Korea’s denuclearization. Such guarantees encompass the cessation of hostile U.S.–DPRK relations, which would require a fundamental transformation of the security environment on the Korean Peninsula. The Hanoi summit vividly demonstrated that, in the presence of significant differences in perceptions regarding denuclearization and the peace regime, reaching a substantive agreement between Washington and Pyongyang is extremely difficult.

What the Panmunjom Meeting Says for Future Negotiations

Chairman Kim met President Trump again at Panmunjom in June 2019. The reunion, initiated by a surprise tweet from President Trump, captured global attention but ultimately failed to produce substantive outcomes. While the unplanned encounter briefly raised hopes in both Washington and Pyongyang that it might serve as a new turning point following the failure of the Hanoi summit, the leaders were only able to agree on the resumption of working-level negotiations. Significant differences in positions persisted, preventing any concrete agreement. North Korea asserted that the United States was not genuinely prepared to engage in nuclear negotiations and instead sought to use the dialogue for domestic political purposes.

The June 2019 Panmunjom meeting illustrates that while sudden, ad hoc meetings between the two leaders are possible, they are unlikely to yield meaningful results. Trump’s eagerness to meet with Kim means that such encounters can occur whenever the North Korean leader decides, but without prior preparation and alignment on objectives, substantive outcomes cannot reasonably be expected.

What Will Bring Kim Jong Un to the Negotiation Table?

What do the three past meetings between President Trump and Chairman Kim signify, and what conditions might bring Kim back to the negotiation table in the future? Considering the current security environment on the Korean Peninsula, the scope of actions the South Korean government can take to facilitate U.S.–DPRK negotiations is limited. Nevertheless, past experiences provide several important lessons.

First, for Kim to engage in negotiations, he must have confidence that he can secure a tangible agreement through persuasion. In 2018, North Korea’s enhanced nuclear capabilities, combined with changes in U.S. foreign policy under President Trump, provided the conditions that brought Kim to the negotiating table. Following the failure of the 2019 Hanoi summit, Kim adopted a strategy of “Heads-on Breakthrough” and, during the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, declared the further enhancement of North Korea’s nuclear capability. This reflected his acknowledgment that, prior to 2017, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities were insufficient to persuade Washington. From this perspective, it is essential to carefully analyze Pyongyang’s current assessment of its nuclear and missile capabilities. Should these advancements since 2020 provide Kim with renewed confidence, the likelihood of another summit with the United States could increase. However, given North Korea’s strengthened ties with Russia through the renewed security treaty and its improved relations with China following participation in the Victory Day events, Kim may feel less compelled to engage with Washington. Additionally, as Kim appears to perceive the current international order as increasingly multipolar, he may see limited necessity in relying exclusively on U.S. engagement.

Nonetheless, considering the historically unstable nature of North Korea’s relations with both China and Russia, Pyongyang cannot permanently depend on these powers for its security and survival. Ultimately, once a certain level of confidence is restored, North Korea may seek negotiations with the United States—the source of the primary strategic threat. While challenging, the South Korean government must strive to ensure that this window of opportunity is opened and carefully identify the optimal timing for engagement.

Second, even an unplanned or sudden meeting between President Trump and Chairman Kim is preferable to no engagement at all. However, for such a meeting to be meaningful, it must still be at least somewhat prepared in advance, even if conducted secretly. For example, Kim undertook more than a 60-hour train journey to Hanoi following the Singapore summit because of expectations that a substantive agreement could be reached. These expectations were grounded in the prior progress of negotiations, facilitated by multiple reciprocal visits between senior officials from both sides, including U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and North Korean Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol. Without such preparatory, high-level U.S.–DPRK engagement—as was the case at Panmunjom—it is unlikely that Kim would approach a summit with realistic expectations of reaching an agreement.

Currently, the South Korean government has limited leverage to initiate or influence high-level U.S.–DPRK negotiations. Nevertheless, Seoul can play a critical role by establishing a foundation for dialogue through detailed roadmaps and by consistently presenting concrete proposals to both Washington and Pyongyang. In the absence of actionable proposals from either the United States or North Korea, South Korea remains the only actor capable of offering feasible solutions. Failure to do so risks Seoul being sidelined in any future U.S.–DPRK engagement. This underscores the importance of maintaining both a strengthened U.S.–ROK alliance and a sustained policy of engagement toward North Korea.

Thir, to influence changes in the international order, a trigger capable of disrupting the existing status quo is often required. In this context, Seoul should cautiously pursue strengthened diplomatic engagement with both China and Russia. Weakening Pyongyang’s reliance on Beijing and Moscow could increase North Korea’s incentives to engage with the United States. While the current consolidation of North Korea’s ties with China and Russia constrains South Korea’s diplomatic maneuverability, Seoul must nevertheless seek to expand strategic space in its foreign policy, taking into account the potential for a multipolar international order. The erosion of security cooperation momentum among the U.S., South Korea, and Japan under the Trump administration further heightens the importance of South Korea’s multidimensional diplomatic efforts. Careful observation of shifts in U.S.–China and U.S.–Russia relations may reveal opportunities for a new security environment, which in turn could increase the likelihood of North Korea’s renewed engagement in negotiations with the United States. ■ 

■ Jihwan HWANG is a Professor of International Relations at the University of Seoul.

■ Translated and edited by Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
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