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In his commemorative national address on the 80th Liberation Day, President Lee Jae Myung presented the new administration's North Korea policy. He declared this year as the opportune time to end the era of confrontation and hostility and jointly usher in a new era of peaceful coexistence and shared growth on the Korean Peninsula. [1]

Lee stated that before discussing the distant future of unification, the foremost task is to immediately restore trust and revive dialogue. Accordingly, he pledged to take measures consistently to substantially reduce tensions and restore trust. Adding that trust is built through actions, not words, Lee announced that the administration would approach North Korea with patience. He emphasized that the administration had already taken steps since the inauguration, including the suspension of leaflet distribution, the halt of loudspeaker broadcasts, and the dismantling of loudspeakers toward the North. Further, he vowed that the South will take proactive and gradual steps to restore the September 19 Military Agreement.

However, the Lee Jae Myung administration's North Korea policy and its proactive trust-building measures stand in stark contrast to two recent statements from Kim Yo Jong, the Vice-Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. On July 28, she declared that “Inter-Korean relations have left behind the era of kinship.” [2] On August 14, she followed by announcing that the “Hope of Seoul is nothing but a foolish dream.” [3]

The pursuit of dialogue and peace for inter-Korean trust-building is neither a new concept nor an unprecedented policy that emerges with every incoming administration. Due to the lack of trust between the two Koreas, peace and trust-building have been constant features of every administration's North Korea policy. The difference, if any, lies in strategy. Despite numerous dialogues and agreements over an extended period, trust has yet to be built. Seoul’s ultimate goal of North Korea policy is to achieve a free and peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula through stability and peace.

Changes in the security environment, however, lead to changes in the strategy for policy goals. The persistent stagnation in inter-Korean trust-building is largely attributable to an absence of strategic development in response to the changes in the security environment. Proactive trust-building measures should be founded on analysis of changes in North Korea's military capacity, its surrounding security environment, and South Korea’s corresponding security strategy, Without such a strategic foundation, the measures are unlikely to achieve the desired outcomes. North Korea is already pursuing strategic shifts reflecting its deepening strategic ties with Russia and the second Trump administration’s effect on itself and South Korea. Based on this rationale, this analysis will focus on Kim Yo Jong's statements to examine how North Korea has demonstrated strategic changes in its policy toward the South and explore their implications.

Kim Yo Jong’s Statements and North Korea's Strategic Shift

Kim Yo Jong has been an active public figure since the early days of Kim Jong Un's rise to power, accompanying him at major events and field inspection tours. However, her official statements began in 2020 after the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit. North Korea has since released statements under her name to announce the Kim Jong Un regime's official position on foreign relations, including policy toward South Korea and the United States. From her first statement on March 3, 2020, to the latest on August 14, 2025, Kim Yo Jong has issued a total of 63 statements. Two of these are termed as ‘announcements of stance,’ but they differ little from her other official statements. As shown in Table 1, her statements could be broadly categorized into four subjects.

Table 1: Kim Yo Jong's Statements by Category and Frequency (March 2020 – August 2025) [4]

Table 1 displays several characteristics of Kim Yo Jong's statements.

First, by subject, statements toward South Korea (25) are the most frequent by an overwhelming margin, followed by statements on the military (21), diplomacy (9), and statements toward the United States (8). Statements toward South Korea include various topics, including criticism of Seoul's North Korea policy, propaganda leaflets, waste-filled balloons, drone incursions, duand the demolition of inter-Korean roads and railways. In contrast, statements on military affairs mostly repeat condemnations and demands to halt ROK-U.S. joint exercises, the deployment of strategic assets, and ROK-U.S.-Japan joint air drills, while promoting North Korea's strengthening of nuclear capability, conduct of military exercises, securing its status as a nuclear state, and testing of strategic weapons.

Second, statements on military affairs were most frequent in 2021 (5) and 2024 (6). The two years account for over half of all military-related statements. Kim Yo Jong issued her first statement on ROK-U.S. joint exercises on March 16, 2021, titled "It Will Be Hard to See Again Spring Days Three Years Ago." [5] Since then, she has consistently released statements in March and August every year, around ROK-U.S. defensive theater-level joint exercises simulating a full-scale war on the peninsula. In the statements, North Korea has announced that it is “uninterested in the exercises’ adjustments in scale or mode.” Instead, Pyongyang asserted that the “restoration of trust could resume its steps after the suspension of joint exercises.” The statement further mentioned that the “choice between hope and despair” of inter-Korean relations was on South Korea. [6] Notably, her statements related to propaganda leaflets and joint exercises have contained threats and warnings. Occasionally, the statements were followed by actions such as the demolition of the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office, the dissolution of inter-Korean dialogue bodies, and the severing of communication lines with the South. [7] It is also noteworthy that since the 8th Party Congress in 2021, statements on military affairs have been equal to or more frequent than statements toward South Korea in every year except 2024.

Third, Kim Yo Jong's statements toward the U.S. and on diplomacy increased after the start of the Ukraine War. The year 2023 was particularly unusual, as she issued three statements toward the U.S. and four on diplomacy. The year also marked the beginning of her statements supporting Russia. In the statement on January 27, 2023, she strongly condemned the U.S. provision of tanks to Ukraine. On April 1, her statement defended Russia by warning that if President Volodymyr Zelenskyy were to accept a U.S. nuclear umbrella, Ukraine would become a legitimate target for a Russian nuclear attack. In another statement on April 29, 2023, she criticized President Joe Biden and the ROK-U.S. Washington Declaration as the “typical product of their extreme anti-DPRK hostile policy, reflecting the most hostile and aggressive will of action.” On her July 17 statement, she explained why Pyongyang rejects Washington’s offers for dialogue. The statement’s confidence was perhaps amplified by the second successful test-launch of the solid-fuel Hwasong-18 ICBM on July 12, which showed significant improvements in performance over the first test in April. [8] She argued that the U.S. overture of “dialogue without preconditions” and “doors are open for diplomacy” is merely a ploy to stop North Korea from doing what the U.S. fears. She asserted that even if U.S.-DPRK talks were to resume, the agenda would inevitably include the "CVID" (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization) of the North Korean nuclear program. [9] She claimed that Pyongyang cannot be persuaded by reversible measures. According to the statement, a halt in the deployment of U.S. strategic assets could be reversed in 10 hours, a suspension of joint exercises in 20 days, and even a withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) could be overturned in 15 days. [10] She stressed that it is illogical for North Korea to irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons—its sovereign right—in exchange for those reversible concessions, and that the U.S. will never find a solution through such means.

Finally, by frequency, Kim Yo Jong issued 7 statements in 2020, 10 in 2021, 5 in 2022, 14 in 2023, 21 in 2024, and 6 as of August 2025. The frequency reached double digits in the years 2021, 2023, and 2024. Those years coincide with an increase in Party Plenary Meetings and a surge in Kim Jong Un's military-related public appearances, reflecting changes in North Korea's internal and external environment. North Korea held only six Plenary Meetings between the 7th and 8th Party Congresses. However, Pyongyang has already convened twelve meetings since the 8th Congress, as of August 2025 before the 9th Congress in 2026. [11] There were four meetings in 2021 and three in 2023. Kim Jong Un's number of public appearances also surpassed 100 in 2023, with military-related appearances reaching 60 in 2023 and 82 in 2024. [12] Furthermore, 2023 saw an unprecedented four enlarged meetings of the Central Military Commission. These changes indicate that North Korea is actively utilizing the Ukraine War as an opportunity for strategic shifts in its policies toward South Korea and the U.S. From the consecutive Russia-DPRK summits in 2023 and 2024 and the signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership to the deployment of North Korean troops and the Putin-Trump summit on August 15, 2025 to end the war, Kim Yo Jong's statements reflect North Korea’s changing security environment and its corresponding strategic evolution.

Implications and Takeaways

The Ukraine War as well as North Korea's subsequent alignment and enhanced strategic cooperation with Russia not only expanded Pyongyang's strategic space vis-à-vis Seoul and Washington but have also relatively increased its strategic value. The protracted war has provided North Korea with a new treaty with Russia and increased opportunities for exchange and cooperation with pro-Russian countries in Eastern Europe and the Global South. Moreover, the combination of the second Trump administration’s emphasis on personal rapport with Kim Jong Un, and the Lee Jae Myung administration’s prioritization of proactive trust-building, lowers the cost of North Korea's "power-for-power" stance. [13]

This is due to the commonalities between the North Korea policies of the Lee administration and the second Trump administration. First, with their emphasis on dialogue, the use of coercive measures is extremely unlikely. The two wars in Europe and the Middle East are still ongoing. Preparations and responses regarding a 2027 Taiwan contingency in the Indo-Pacific increase the need for stability on the Korean Peninsula. Second, both administrations place weight on stability. The Lee administration has stressed the importance of present stability over a distant future of unification. As a trust-building measure, the administration announced it will take proactive and gradual steps to restore the September 19 Military Agreement, which was fully suspended during the previous administration. Third, both are using ambiguous language on terms that could provoke North Korea or are hinting at potential policy shifts. The term "Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Denuclearization (CVID)" of North Korea is shifting to the "Complete Denuclearization (CD) of the Korean Peninsula." The terms "Verifiable" and "Irreversible," which North Korea finds sensitive, are beginning to disappear. [14] Furthermore, recent U.S. reports on North Korean human rights have omitted criticism of the Kim Jong Un regime and have been halved in length. The Lee administration is considering not publishing its 2025 report on North Korean human rights. Fourth, both administrations are conflating the principles and methods of North Korea policy. The principles intended to guide dialogue are instead being utilized as means to resume the dialogue. Finally, the North Korea policies of both the ROK and the U.S. are focused on Kim Jong Un as their sole "audience."

These approaches shared by Seoul and Washington could increase the likelihood that the situation on the Korean Peninsula develops toward an undesirable direction. The current circumstances present an optimal timeframe for North Korea to exert pressure. [15] Pyongyang could present a maximalist list of demands, including the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint exercises, the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea, the recognition of its nuclear status, and the lifting of sanctions. Conversely, even if the ROK and the U.S. were to shift from dialogue to pressure, North Korea would have nothing to lose, as it would continue the status quo of the "power-for-power" stance it has long maintained. [16]

Resuming dialogue for the sake of stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula is necessary. However, we must not overlook the history of inter-Korean relations, which has shown that dialogue in itself neither guarantees stability and peace nor builds trust. Now, more than ever, is the time for the Russian proverb: "Trust, but verify." ■ 

[1] 이 대통령, “9.19 군사합의 복원...긴장완화 조치 일관되제 취할 것”, 「정책브리핑」, https://www.korea.kr/news/policyNewsView.do?newsId=148947640

[2] “조한관계는 동족이라는 개념의 시간대를 완전히 벗어났다”, 「조선중앙통신」, 2025.7.28.

[3] “서울의 희망은 어리석은 꿈에 불과하다”, 「조선중앙통신」, 2025.8.14.

[4] Source: Kim Yo Jong's statements via Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) categorized by the author.

[5] “3년 전의 봄날은 다시 돌아오기 어려울 것이다”, 「로동신문」, 2021.3.16.

[6] 김여정 담화, 「조선중앙통신」, 2021.8.1.

[7] 김종원, “북한 김여정 담화 분석”, 「INSS 전략보고」, 2022.12.

[8] 「로동신문」, 2023.7.13. Rodong Sinmun announced that the projectile ascended to a maximum altitude of 6,648.4 km and flew for 4,291 seconds over a distance of 1,001.2 km, before accurately hitting the target waters in the international waters of the East Sea.

[9] 김여정 담화, 「조선중앙통신」, 2023.7.17.

[10] Ibid.

[11] 이호령, “북한 노동당 제8기 제12차 전원회의 평가와 시사점”, 「KIDA 안보전략 FOCUS」, 2025.7.4.

[12] Ibid.

[13] North Korea shifted its policy principle toward the U.S. and South Korea from "power-for-power and goodwill-for-goodwill" in 2021 to "power-for-power, head-on confrontation" starting in 2022. In December 2024, the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee announced the launch of the “toughest strategy to counteract the United States."

[14] “'CVID 대신 CD' '북한 대신 한반도'... 한미, 대북 대화엔 '교감'”, 「한국일보」, 2025.7.13.; “트럼프 2기 첫 北인권보고서, 분량 절반 축소… 정치체제 비판 빠져”, 「조선일보」, 2025.8.13.;“ 정부, 북한인권보고서 올해 미발간 검토…남북관계 고려한 듯”, 「중앙일보」, 2025.8.12.

[15] 이호령·전경주, “김여정 담화를 통해 본 북한의 협상전략과 우리의 대응방향”, 「안보전략 FOCUS」, 2025.8.5.

[16] Kim Yo Jong has emphasized that superiority in strength is the most suitable method for achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, stating that the U.S. should know that the more it strengthens the extended deterrence system and the more excessively it expands the military alliance system, a threatening entity, the farther North Korea will be farther from the negotiating table. 김여정 담화, 「조선중앙통신」, 2023.7.17.; Furthermore, Kim Yo Jong has demanded a new approach that presumes North Korea's status as a nuclear-weapon state, arguing, "2025 is not 2018 or 2019.” The statement demanded recognition of North Korea’s status as an irreversible nuclear state, and the fact that North Korea’s capabilities, and its geopolitical environment have all fundamentally changed. 김여정 담화, 「조선중앙통신」, 2025.7.28.

■ Ho Ryung LEE is a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).

■ Edited by Inhwan OH, Senior Research Fellow; Jong Hyuk CHUNG, Researcher, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 202) | ihoh@eai.or.kr