On June 3, 2025, South Korea elected long-time opposition leader Lee Jae Myung in a snap presidential election. Lee had lost the March 2022 election to Yoon Suk-yeol by the narrowest of margins, but became favored to lead the country after Yoon’s failed martial law attempt in December 2024, subsequent impeachment, and removal from office. Lee successfully positioned himself as the clearest alternative to Yoon and was inaugurated into office just hours after winning the national vote.

Under the conservative Yoon administration, the situation on the Korean Peninsula had become increasingly tense, with Pyongyang advancing its nuclear programs, weapons delivery systems, and its ideological demonization of Seoul. While trying to justify his short-lived martial law, Yoon pledged to “eradicate pro-North Korean forces” and counter malign Chinese influence in South Korea’s democracy. Relations with Beijing were less than amicable, given China’s assertive foreign policy and its deepening strategic rivalry and trade war (Easley and Kim, 2024a) with the United States. On top of this, the global political environment had become more severe, with Russia’s war in Ukraine and its cooperation with North Korea, conflicts escalating in the Middle East, and Trump’s pressure on allies and partners to shoulder more of the burden for maintaining the rules-based order.

Domestically, the Yoon vs. Lee lawfare since the 2022 presidential election contributed to South Korea’s political polarization. Prosecutors pursued five different indictments against Lee, while the opposition leader strengthened his control over the Democratic Party and helped expand its legislative majority. The opposition wielded National Assembly powers – such as proposing special investigations, impeaching government officials, and withholding budgets – while blocking the legislative initiatives of the conservative party. As Lee takes over the presidency, his party still dominates the National Assembly, giving him greater policymaking prerogative than a leader who faced divided government.

Lee’s recent presidential campaign and inaugural speech stressed centrist pragmatism, but his past political positions were intensely criticized by Korean conservatives and attracted the attention of foreign policy observers abroad. Examples include his controversial references to Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il as “the forefathers of our North Korea,” historically charged comments about combined military exercises with Japan risking a path to re-invasion by colonial forces, and his suggestion that South Korea say “xie xie to both China and Taiwan,” and stay out of a contingency across the Taiwan Strait.

After the removal from office of a conservative president who was focused on military deterrence, economic security, and alliance cooperation, many analysts expected a markedly different diplomatic agenda from the opposition leader who transformed the progressive party, perhaps representing an evolution of engagement policies in the tradition of presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Moon Jae-in. Yet, one month into the Lee administration, there has not been diplomatic whiplash but rather calculated continuity. Why has the scope for foreign policy change been limited after South Korea’s dramatic political transition?

U.S. Alliance: Still the Foundation of ROK Foreign Policy

One reason Seoul’s foreign policy has changed less than expected is the enduring strategic importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Despite Trump’s tariffs, burden-sharing demands, and critical statements and tweets, Seoul cannot cut ties with the U.S. in favor of bandwagoning with China or building its own nuclear weapons.

South Koreans often discuss the problem of “security with America and economy with China” (안미경중). But this debate is not about making a strategic decision; rather, it reflects a desire to reduce friction and manage risks while enjoying simultaneous benefits from relations with the two competing superpowers. In other words, the dilemma is more a matter of practicing political-economic pragmatism than hedging according to international relations theory.

Seoul is solidly an ally of Washington because of its own national interests, so a new South Korean administration does not have a realignment decision to make. However, increased deliberations about autonomy are to be expected, as South Korea is more capable than in decades past. It is good domestic politics for a government to show its people efforts to safeguard national interests and avoid over-relying on others. And the very nature of Trump’s deal-making — using uncertainty as leverage — raises questions about extended deterrence, so leaders need to do their due diligence.

However, a progressive administration in Seoul is less likely to talk about an independent deterrent, a return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, or South Korean nuclear latency. Progressives tend to see those policies as either impractical or too expensive. South Korean conservatives were frustrated because nothing seemed to work with North Korea and they wanted to push Beijing to be more helpful with or at least not enable Pyongyang.

South Korean progressives take an approach of not antagonizing North Korea or China unnecessarily. The Yoon administration frequently talked about the end of the Kim regime and was rhetorically insensitive to topics that are sensitive for China. As the leader of the opposition party, Lee Jae Myung was often undiplomatic; as president, he is likely to be more diplomatic. This involves avoiding the appearance of being all-in on Washington. Yet, the U.S.-ROK alliance will remain just as important as it was before South Korea’s six months of political turmoil from December 2024 to June 2025.

ROK-Japan Relations: If It’s Been Fixed, Don’t Break It

A second reason Seoul may exhibit more policy continuity than change is because of the value of relations with fellow U.S. ally, Japan. South Korean progressives, including Lee Jae Myung, while in opposition, have been accused of using anti-Japan sentiment as a weapon against Tokyo and domestic rivals. However, bashing Japan does not make political sense now, given different circumstances compared to when Roh Moo-hyun or Moon Jae-in was president.

Some previous administrations that prioritized engagement of North Korea did not prioritize relations with Japan, and may have even believed that disputes with Tokyo could bring Seoul and Pyongyang closer together. But after the failed U.S.-DPRK summit at Hanoi and the Covid-19 pandemic, the Kim regime slammed the door on diplomacy. That door may not be locked, but North Korea has not responded to South Korean attempts to knock, instead enacting laws against foreign cultural pollution and adopting a “two hostile states doctrine.” Therefore, there are few inter-Korean tradeoffs for Seoul’s cooperation with Tokyo, and productive relations with Japan might actually allow the ROK to reengage the DPRK from a position of strength.

Compared to recent decades, South Korean public opinion and NGOs are not as focused on historical issues. Tokyo still needs to take further steps for reconciliation and to respect sensitivities over Japanese colonialism and aggression in the previous century. Nationalist actors in Japan can still damage relations with Seoul. However, generational change in South Korea means there is less attention on historical disputes and more interest in economic opportunities.

As the rules-based international order is under significant stress, Seoul and Tokyo need each other even more for stable deterrence and engagement in Asia, as well as for economic security cooperation. The two countries are working on supply chain resilience for critical technologies and materials, and can tighten export controls and sanctions implementation efforts. Seoul-Tokyo alignment is of growing relevance for development cooperation, as well as cyber, maritime, and energy security. Coordinating efforts with Washington can make Seoul and Tokyo’s cooperation more efficient and effective, so that U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateralism (Easley and Kim, 2024b) provides much needed international public goods.

Recognizing the Threat of Russia-DPRK Illegal Trade

A third reason why South Korea may not change policy as much as expected is the increasingly negative role of Russia on the Korean Peninsula. Moscow’s illegal aggression against Ukraine not only violates the UN Charter, it also causes dysfunction of the UN Security Council and other agencies relevant for dealing with Pyongyang. Putin’s war is linking the European and Indo-Pacific theaters of security, complicating efforts to engage Pyongyang and possibly running counter to China’s interests.

While policymakers and analysts often discuss South Korea navigating security relations with the U.S. and economic relations with China, the real problem is North Korea using Russia for military advancement and China for economic benefit. Russia’s arms trade, employment of North Korean troops, technology transfer, and potential military exercises with the DPRK risk fueling an arms race in East Asia. Meanwhile, Moscow’s de facto recognition of North Korea as a nuclear weapons state contradicts Beijing’s long-standing policy of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Russia vetoed the extension of the UN Panel of Experts monitoring DPRK sanctions, poisoned prospects for multilateral dialogue similar to the Six-Party Talks, and has made it difficult for European countries to engage Pyongyang because of North Korea’s material support for Putin’s war effort. Russia’s blatant violations of UN sanctions threaten regional security, including China’s interest in stability. Until Moscow’s counterproductive policies are addressed, it will be difficult to expect Pyongyang’s acceptance of Seoul’s diplomatic overtures or mitigation of so-called bloc confrontation in East Asia.

Time for Pragmatic Engagement

Although a major foreign policy shift by South Korea is not yet observable and may even be undesirable, rhetorical changes under the new administration can open up space for diplomacy. Stakeholders with interests on the Korean Peninsula ought to avoid demanding concessions as a precondition for dialogue and instead focus on pragmatic engagement. Put simply, they should avoid own-goals and pick low-hanging fruit.

Avoiding counterproductive behavior includes Trump dialing back his political-economic pressure tactics against allies and partners, while Tokyo continues to refrain from stirring historical controversies. North Korea should abstain from nuclear or inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests as well as from cyber or maritime attacks. Leaders in Beijing would be wise to avoid stoking anti-China sentiment in South Korea by curbing coercive economic measures as well as grey-zone tactics in the overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of the Yellow Sea.

In the early months of Lee’s presidency, there are opportunities for meaningful, low-cost diplomatic gains. Within his first month in office, Lee met with Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba at the G7 Summit in Canada, and the two governments jointly marked the 60th anniversary of normalized relations with forward-looking events that emphasized people-to-people exchanges and functional cooperation. By early August, Lee may travel to Washington for a summit with Trump to sign a trade deal to avert the imposition of exorbitant tariffs. If Xi Jinping visits South Korea for the APEC Summit in November, there will be a significant chance to renormalize Seoul-Beijing relations at a more cooperative equilibrium.

Inter-Korean relations remain fraught, but incremental improvement is possible. While reinstatement of the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA) may be out of reach, recent events suggest a tacit understanding about reciprocity. Pyongyang paused its trash balloon launches during South Korea’s recent political turmoil, and upon taking office, the Lee administration discouraged NGOs from sending leaflets northward. Just one day after Lee ordered South Korea’s propaganda loudspeakers turned off, the North halted its noise broadcasts that had unsettled border communities. South Korea’s repatriation of six North Korean fishermen in July 2025 fits this pattern of indirect coordination without direct communication. It is important to consider whether Seoul is fully following its own democratic legal procedures, working transparently with the United Nations Command, and adequately prioritizing human rights. But if inter-Korean mutual restraint can be expanded to include drones and signal jamming, and if it leads to the reactivation of military hotlines, the two sides can rebuild confidence and reduce the risk of unintended escalation.

It is normally prudent for a new administration to first appoint key personnel, review past policies, address domestic concerns, and develop a coherent foreign policy grounded in both strategic realities and political constraints. But given current international challenges, there is no time for the Lee administration to waste. It is inadvisable to “throw the baby out with the bathwater” by discarding existing policies in favor of an “anything but Yoon” approach. Instead, the Lee government can double down on trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo in the process of convincing Beijing – and eventually Pyongyang – that relations with South Korea are too valuable to be gambled away in the placing of losing bets on Putin’s revisionist Russia. ■ 

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■ Leif-Eric EASLEY (Ph.D. in Government, Harvard University) is Professor at Ewha Womans University in Seoul where he teaches international security and political economics. He appreciates excellent research assistance from Dabin Choi.

■ Edited by Inhwan OH, Senior Research Fellow; Jong Hyuk CHUNG, Research Associate, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
    For inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 202) | ihoh@eai.or.kr