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Recently, the Ministry of Unification announced through the press that it plans to actively support the passage of an amendment to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act[1] that would delete the provision uniformly deeming "members of overseas organizations that operate in accordance with North Korea's line" to be North Korean residents.[2] The amendment presents as its main issues the ambiguity of the provision, its duplication of regulation with other laws, its conflict with citizens' constitutional status, and its failure to reflect historical changes. The Ministry of Unification has expressed its agreement with the amendment, stating that it is necessary to expand the autonomy of private-sector exchange and to create the conditions for revitalizing exchange and cooperation.[3] This represents a shift that reexamines the system’s foundation for the first time since the enactment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act in 1990.

The Debate over Deleting Article 30, 36 Years On

There is a point that must first be clarified in the discussion about this amendment. The press has often explained this amendment primarily in terms of abolishing the obligation to report contact with Chongryon-affiliated figures, which makes it easy to mistakenly understand Article 30 as a provision that specifically targets Chongryon. However, under the law, Article 30 does not directly designate the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) as a specific organization. The law deems "members of overseas organizations that operate in accordance with North Korea's line" to be North Korean residents, and the object of application is likewise determined not by nationality but by whether a person is a member of such an organization. Accordingly, even a holder of Republic of Korea nationality may become subject to the provision if confirmed to be a member of this kind of organization. Who qualifies as a member is the crux of the matter, yet the legal criteria for making this determination are not clear.

Another point that must be distinguished is that abolishing the obligation to report contact and changing the legal character of Chongryon are entirely different matters. Even if Article 30 is deleted, this does not change the fact that Chongryon is an organization of Korean residents in Japan that has maintained a close relationship with North Korea, nor does it alter the application of related laws, including the National Security Act. The disappearance of the obligation to report contact with Chongryon members—who had been deemed North Korean residents under Article 30—does not mean that unlawful conduct is thereby permitted or exempted from liability. As before, if an act in violation of related laws such as the National Security Act were to occur, the corresponding legal responsibility would continue to apply.

However, if the discussion on this amendment becomes solely focused on the question of for or against deregulation, it risks missing a truly important question. In this article, the term "Chongryon-affiliated" is used to encompass the Chongryon organization itself, Chongryon-affiliated educational institutions such as Korean schools (Chosun schools) and Korea University (Chosun University), and the community of Koreans in Japan that has maintained relations with them.

Of course, the Chongryon organization and the Chongryon-affiliated community of Koreans in Japan are closely linked, but they are not identical. Even within the Chongryon-affiliated community of Koreans in Japan, individuals' nationality, educational experience, and political orientation vary widely. This raises the question of whether the Chongryon-affiliated community today still resembles what it was at the time the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act was enacted in 1990. The significance of deleting Article 30 begins precisely with this question.

A Changed Chongryon Society: Can It Still Be Explained by the System of 1990?

From January to April 2026, the author conducted in-depth interviews in Japan with young people who had studied or worked at Korean schools (Chosun schools) or Korea University (Chosun University). This research was not intended to confirm the official position of Chongryon's central organization, but rather to examine how changes in North Korea's policy toward South Korea have affected the educational settings centered on Korean schools and Korea University, as well as the perceptions of unification and identity among young people who gone through these institutions.

The changes confirmed in the field could not be solely explained by the "increase of Republic of Korea nationality holders within Chongryon." This is presented as one of the grounds for this institutional reform. While there were young people who, despite retaining Chosun-seok (Korean nationality unaffiliated with either Korean state) status, showed interest in South Korean culture and were actively engaged in exchange with South Korean society, cases were also confirmed of individuals who, despite having acquired Republic of Korea nationality, maintained an orientation toward North Korea. There were also a few cases in which nationality was chosen for practical reasons such as further education, employment, and convenience of overseas travel. In the past, nationality or organizational affiliation was accepted as a criterion for gauging an individual's political orientation or identity, but it is now difficult to regard it as such any longer.

One of the changes confirmed in the interviews was that, following North Korea's declaration of the "two hostile states theory," perceptions and the educational environment within Chongryon society have been changing rapidly. Some interview participants recalled the moment in December 2023 when Chairman Kim Jong Un formalized the two hostile states theory using expressions such as "shock," "bewilderment," and "betrayal." Within the generation that had long regarded unification as a matter of life and death and had received education centered on the national community, a sense of loss regarding the "fatherland" emerged. Moreover some cases were confirmed in which individuals who had maintained Chosun-seok status subsequently changed to South Korean nationality. In contrast, the younger generations showed a variety of responses depending on the specific generation and individual, with some attempting to understand the North Korean authorities' policy and intent amid the confusion, and others interpreting it not as an abandonment of unification but as a strategic shift in policy toward South Korea.

These changes were also confirmed in educational settings. At Korea University (Chosun University), the second verse of the school song, which contains the phrase "unification of the fatherland," is no longer being sung, and at some Korean schools, the use of the unified Korea flag at sports festivals and the "Unification Train"[4] event held at the end of sports festivals have reportedly been discontinued. It was also confirmed that geography education, which had previously covered the Korean peninsula as a whole, is being adjusted to center on North Korea, and that textbooks have been changed to reflect this. Although there are differences by region and school, and this does not directly confirm the official policy of Chongryon's central organization, it can be said to be an example showing that changes in North Korea's policy toward South Korea are affecting at least some Chongryon-affiliated educational settings and the daily lives of their members.

Changes in identity were also clearly evident. Many participants, even while expressing an orientation toward North Korea, were engaged in deep reflection to the point of asking themselves the question, "What country am I from?" Young people who had accepted both South and North Korea as part of their identity were experiencing greater confusion than before North Korea's policy change. At the same time, it was confirmed that the younger the age group, the less likely they were to perceive the issue of unification as a concern of their own.

This does not mean, however, that these changes directly lead to Chongryon society's departure from North Korea or the abandonment of unification. There were still participants in the interviews who spoke of expectations and hope for unification, and artistic activities such as traditional Korean dance and music, which serve as an important foundation for sustaining identity alongside language, also continuted at some institutions. This is symbolically depicted in director Son Myung-a's film Trophy, recently released in Japan. Meanwhile, relations with North Korea are also continuing, as visits to the "fatherland" that had been suspended due to the pandemic have resumed and North Korea's support for education funding continues. In this way, within the Chongryon-affiliated community, the ways in which views on North Korea and the community interact have become far more diverse across generations and individuals than in the past. Hence, discussions on Article 30 of the amendment also need to extend to how this new reality should be reflected in the system.

Limitations of the System and Policy

Before conducting the in-depth interviews in Japan, the author also went through the procedure of reporting contact with North Korean residents under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act. However, the current contact reporting procedure is designed on the premise of exchange centered on projects or institutions between South and North Korea, and there are aspects in which it does not align with field-based academic research that requires recruiting subjects and repeated contact. There is also the possibility of conflict with research ethics, which is premised on the anonymity and confidentiality of research participants. This is because of the requirement to submit the personal information of contact subjects. These problems, whether or not Article 30 is deleted, need to be addressed while operating the contact reporting system going forward.

This possible institutional reform is meaningful in that it reduces the psychological and administrative burden that had been placed on the general public and researchers. However, caution is needed in directly linking this to the revitalization of exchange. Although there is an expectation in some quarters that this institutional reform will lead to the renewal of exchange, the policy environment surrounding exchange has in fact changed considerably from the past. In its constitutional amendment, North Korea deleted unification-related provisions and newly established a territorial provision in accordance with the "two hostile states theory,"[5] and Chongryon has likewise been adjusting the direction of its organizational operations, including abolishing unification-related organizations and deleting related content from its charter.[6]

Our government is seeking to lower the institutional threshold for contact, but the environment surrounding North Korea and Chongryon is undergoing a change in the very foundation of exchange itself, alongside a weakening of the social basis for contact amid the deterioration of unification discourse and changes within the community. Under these circumstances, the policy premise that easing the obligation to report contact will naturally expand exchange does not sufficiently reflect the reality of Chongryon society today. Within today's Chongryon-affiliated community of Koreans in Japan, there is differentiation across various layers, including Chongryon's central organization and educational settings, the younger generation and the older generation, and Chosun-seok status, Republic of Korea nationality, and Japanese nationality. The ways in which North Korean policy is accepted, the perspectives from which South Korean society is viewed, and the reasons for maintaining one’s community all differ from one another. Some still regard their relationship with North Korea as important, while others perceive life, education, employment, and discrimination issues within Japanese society as more important challenges.

Nevertheless, policy still tends to assume "Chongryon" to be a single, homogeneous group. Whereas until now Chongryon members had been uniformly deemed North Korean residents and made subject to contact reporting, there is a possibility that, after the amendment, they will simply be uniformly excluded from the object of regulation instead. Whether maintaining or easing regulation, if the differences within Chongryon society are not examined, then the object that policy addresses had no fundamental change. The deletion of Article 30 is an institutional change that corrects the uniform deeming of individuals as North Korean residents, but the policy task of how to distinguish among contact subjects and with whom and in what manner relationships should be formed still remains.

Deletion Must Not Be the End

In this regard, what the discussion on the amendment is missing is the question of "what comes after deletion." The deletion of Article 30 may be a measure that reduces the institutional burden associated with contact reporting, but a policy blueprint for who to form relationships with, in what manner, and in which fields exchange should continue thereafter has not yet been sufficiently presented. The task going forward is not to remain confined to the debate over whether to maintain or abolish contact reporting, but to consider a new policy foundation for what kind of long-term relationship can be formed with the changed Chongryon-affiliated community of Koreans in Japan. This is also an area that must be considered jointly not only by unification policy but also by policy toward overseas compatriots, education and culture policy, and academic exchange policy.

In particular, as confirmed in the field research, cultural and artistic activities such as traditional Korean dance and music have, for some young people, become established as part of daily life through which they confirm their roots and identity and connect with the community, prior to any political ideology. Future exchange policy should share the long-term goal of unification, while focusing on establishing a foundation for everyday exchange, centered on language, through which history, culture, and the arts can be learned and carried forward together.

The deletion of Article 30 can be a starting point for institutional reform that keeps up with historical shifts. However, changing the system alone does not mean that the purpose of policy will thereby be achieved. What is now needed is to place at the center of policy not the question of "whom to manage" but rather "with whom, and what kind of relationship, we will build." Only when an individual's perceptions and orientation are not judged solely by their relationship with Chongryon, whether they hold Chosun-seok status, or their educational experience at Korean schools or Korea University, and when the changed Chongryon-affiliated community of Koreans in Japan is understood as a community with diverse lives and experiences with which a long-term relationship is built, will the significance of this institutional reform finally be completed. ■ 

[1] The partial amendment bill to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, proposed by Representative Lee Yong-sun and nine other lawmakers, contains provisions converting the current system of reporting contact with North Korean residents into a reporting system that does not require acceptance for approval, and deleting Article 30, the provision deeming certain persons to be North Korean residents.

[2] Ha Chae-rim, Yonhap News. "'Free Contact with Chongryon Figures'... Push to Abolish the North Korean Resident Deeming Provision (Comprehensive)," July 10, 2026. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260709198951504

[3] National Assembly Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee, Review Report on the Partial Amendment Bill to the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act (prepared by Senior Researcher Kim Sa-woo, principally proposed by Representative Lee Yong-sun, Bill No. 2213708), 429th National Assembly (Regular Session), November 2025, p. 8.

[4] The "Unification Train" is a collective marching event held at the end of a program, in which participants form a line resembling a train by holding the shoulders or waist of the person in front of them, moving together to the song "The Unification Train Runs" (lyrics by Pak San-un, music by Mo Yong-il, composed in North Korea in 1961), expressing a sense of community and the symbolism of unification through song and chants.

[5] Yonhap News, "[Table] Contents of North Korea's Constitutional Amendment," May 6, 2026. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20260506104300504

[6] KBS, "Chongryon Deletes 'Unification' at General Assembly... 'Struggle to Defend National Rights,'" May 26, 2026. https://news.kbs.co.kr/news/pc/view/view.do?ncd=8570170

■ Seunghee HA is a Research Professor at the Institute for North Korean Studies, Dongguk University.

■ Translated and edited by Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate; Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Suhyung KANG, EAI Intern; Sowon KIM, EAI Intern.
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