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The purpose of this research is to evaluate the achievements and shortcomings of the ROK-U.S. alliance in managing crises on the Korean Peninsula, and to explore strategies for creating peace by transforming the unstable armistice structure into a permanent peace regime. The ROK-U.S. alliance was established through the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty signed on October 1, 1953. The alliance has played a pivotal role in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula. Through this, it has made a decisive contribution to building a prosperous and free Republic of Korea—now the world's 13th largest economy, an advanced liberal democracy, and a soft-powerhouse through K-Culture. However, the alliance has failed to effectively deter North Korea's armed provocations in violation of the Armistice Agreement. From the Armistice to the present day, North Korea has not ceased its numerous infiltrations and local provocations. To be liberated from the anxiety of war, we must move beyond merely managing an unstable armistice structure and establish a permanent, stable peace regime.

Under this awareness and strategic understanding, this article aims to evaluate the reality of crisis management through case analysis and draw implications. It also seeks to examine why the transition of Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) and ROK-U.S. combined exercises and training are essential to deter North Korean provocations. Subsequently, this article discusses measures for building military trust among South Korea, North Korea, and the United States—a prerequisite for establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. This article then proposes a roadmap for establishing a peace regime, including the conclusion of a Korean Peninsula peace agreement, through operational arms control and structural arms control. Finally, this article proposes the establishment of a ‘ROK-U.S. Unification Consultative Committee’ directly under the President to build a free and unified Korea.

I. Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula

Forged as blood allies through the Korean War, the ROK-U.S. alliance has played a decisive role in deterring war on the Korean Peninsula over the past 70 years through its combined combat readiness posture. It is highly unusual in human history for such an unstable armistice structure to persist for so long.

Since the end of the Korean War, North Korea has repeatedly violated the Armistice Agreement through infiltrations and local provocations. These include the failed raid on the Blue House on January 21, 1968, and the Uljin-Samcheok infiltration in November 1968; the Axe Murder Incident at Panmunjom in 1976; the Rangoon bombing in 1983; the Korean Air Flight 858 bombing in 1987, the infiltration in the Gangneung area in 1996, the First Naval Clash of Yeonpyeong in 1999 and the Second Naval Clash of Yeonpyeong in 2002, the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in March 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010, the landmine incident and Operation 8·20 in 2015. This amounts to a staggering 3,121 violations of the Armistice Agreement, including 2,022 infiltration incidents and 1,119 localized provocations.[1] In addition, North Korea waged the balloon incident in 2024, and the recent frequent violations of the Military Demarcation Line within the Demilitarized Zone in 2025.

The Ministry of National Defense announced on November 17, 2025, “We formally propose holding inter-Korean military talks to discuss establishing a baseline for the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) in order to prevent accidental clashes between the North and South and ease military tensions.” In the statement, the Ministry pointed out, “Recently, while the North Korean military has been installing tactical roads and barbed wire fences and laying mines along the Military Demarcation Line within the Demilitarized Zone, situations where some personnel cross the MDL and intrude into our territory have continuously occurred.”[2]

Last year, North Korea also infiltrated 8,870 balloons into South Korean airspace over 3,097 occasions during a period of about seven months from May 8 to November 28, causing 3,358 trash balloons to fall across the entire territory and unsettling the entire population.[3] Despite the assessment that the purpose was to conduct preliminary calculations for deploying wartime chemical and biological weapons alongside disrupting public sentiment, the response measures and cooperative system between the ROK military and the UNC (United Nations Command) failed to function properly. ROK military collected the dropped balloons while preventing civilians from approaching them. Had measures been taken in cooperation with the UNC to prevent them from crossing the DMZ, further provocative acts could have been prevented. Regarding our military's resumption of loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea as a countermeasure to its persistent trash balloon launches, a UNC investigation concluded that this not only fails to deter North Korea's trash balloon provocations but also provides a pretext for additional launches. Furthermore, the UNC warned that ROK military's entry into the DMZ without the UNC Commander's approval to install loudspeakers and broadcast psychological warfare messages to the North constitutes a violation of the Armistice Agreement.[4] The Military Armistice Commission failed to investigate North Korea's violations of the Armistice Agreement and devise measures to prevent recurrence.

The sinking of the Cheonan and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010 offer critical insights into what kind of ROK-U.S. cooperation system must be established to effectively manage crises. Despite the sinking of the Cheonan—being struck by a torpedo and suffering 46 casualties during its patrol inside territorial waters—no retaliatory strikes were launched. In broad daylight, Yeonpyeong Island suffered an act of aggression in which civilians were killed and homes burned by North Korean artillery fire. The response was limited to artillery counter-fire, and F-16 fighter jets that were scrambled were unable to carry out punitive bombing and returned to base. This reflects that the measures taken during the Yeonpyeong Island shelling provocation—such as the Commander-in-Chief's directive to “exercise restraint” and the Minister of National Defense's actions based on the UN Command's Armistice Rules of Engagement (AROE), which emphasize proportionality—were inappropriate for a President serving as Commander-in-Chief when the nation's territory was under attack.[5]

The South Korean military has been at the mercy of North Korean forces because it has failed to respond with strong military retaliation, such as exercising its right to self-defense, against North Korea's relentless and unprovoked military provocations. Why has the South Korean military been so powerless in the face of North Korean provocations? Unlike North Korea, which has nothing to lose in an escalation, the ROK military has been unable to deliver a strong response due to the anxiety that its carefully built economy could collapse in an instant. Furthermore, despite possessing the capability to independently assess and act in crisis situations, the ROK military does not have authority to crisis management in accordance with CODA.[6]

The unique dynamics of the Korean Peninsula's security structure, the dual-track ROK-U.S. combined defense system operating in wartime and peacetime, and the UNC's AROE have acted as limiting factors. The security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula can rapidly escalate from peacetime to crisis and then to wartime. This dual structure involves the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercising peacetime operational control, which transfers to the Combined Forces Commander when tensions rise and when the defense readiness posture (DEFCON) is elevated. The ROK-U.S. CFC, based on delegated authority, exercises crisis management, early warning, operational planning development, combined training, and inter-operability. The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) conducts local provocation operations, vigilance operations, unit training, and disaster relief. The ROK JCS lack authority over crisis management. Specifically, to prevent North Korean provocations from escalating into war, the ROK military's actions were constrained by principles developed by the UNC: proportionality of equal kind and measure, and rules of engagement stipulating higher-level approval for return fire if provoked with worse lethal weapon systems. Particularly regarding premeditated acts of aggression like the Yeonpyeong Island shelling, which violated South Korean territory, the right to self-defense should have been exercised. This is guaranteed by the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and the Hague Conventions, as such acts constitute war crimes[7] violating Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and Article 8 of the Rome Statute.

To address these issues, the crisis management system must be overhauled to function properly. Authority for crisis management must be transferred to the ROK military. If, in the future, the ROK government fails to exercise its right to self-defense immediately against North Korean provocations due to concerns about escalation, the very existence of the government and our military will face severe challenges both domestically and internationally. The government and military must agree on the principle of respecting the exercise of the right to self-defense as a forceful retaliatory response to North Korea's deliberate provocations, provided that perfect information sharing and measures to prevent escalation have been secured through prior consultations with the United States and the UNC. Rules of engagement must be revised and supplemented accordingly. In the event of North Korean provocation, the combined forces must be deployed immediately to prepare for any contingency. Only by punishing not only the point of origin of the provocation but also the command and supporting forces with swift and decisive action can further provocations be deterred.[8] Furthermore, to restore the unstable armistice structure to normalcy, the North Korean and Chinese delegations that withdrew in 1994 must return to the Panmunjom Military Armistice Commission. Should any violation of the Armistice Agreement occur, the Military Armistice Commission, which administers the agreement, must immediately conduct on-site investigations and take countermeasures to prevent further breaches of the Armistice Agreement.

1. The Importance of Transferring Operational Control for Crisis Management

This system operates such that if tensions escalate during counter-provocation operations conducted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leading to a DEFCON elevation, the Commander of the Combined Forces Command assumes operational control of the ROK military and takes over the operation. No country in the world maintains a dual command structure as such during peacetime.

At the first inter-Korean defense ministers' meeting in 2001, North Korea's People's Armed Forces Minister Kim Il-chol cynically remarked to then-South Korean Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae, “Even if we reach an agreement with the South Korean military, which lacks operational control, it will be futile if the U.S. undermines it.” This is also the primary reason North Korea bypasses South Korea and deals directly with the U.S. Having observed the Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling provocation, Kim Jong-un likely discerned the vulnerability of the ROK-U.S. combined defense system. This may have fostered his arrogant perception, expressed in a letter to President Trump on August 5, 2019 saying that “the ROK forces are no match for his Army.”[9]

An ROK Army General should be appointed as the Commander of the Combined Forces Command, and a U.S. Army General as the Deputy Commander, thereby adjusting the leadership command structure of the Combined Forces Command to transition wartime operational control. Ultimately, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should exercise peacetime operational control, and the same individual should perform the duties of the Commander of the Combined Forces Command during wartime, unifying the command structure. Only then can crisis management and warfare be conducted in a unified and coordinated manner. This transition of wartime operational control presents an opportunity to reorganize the leadership into a joint force system. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would handle military strategy, force enhancement, and military diplomacy. The Strategic Command would be elevated to Joint Forces Command, with the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force concurrently serving as Commanders of the Ground, Navy, and Air Force Operations Commands, respectively, under the command of the Joint Forces Commander. In peacetime, the Joint Forces Commander will concurrently serve as the Combined Forces Commander, directing operations against local provocations. In wartime, the unity of command is required, with the Combined Forces Command Commander commanding the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces.

2. Crisis Management, Combined Exercises and Training

Combined training is conducted as part of the combined combat readiness posture. Base Strong position occupation training and ROK-U.S. combined maneuver training have the effect of deterring North Korean military provocations. This is because the deployed ROK-U.S. combined forces can respond immediately any provocations.

Furthermore, exercises and training based on actual combat scenarios provide the means to fight and win in times of crisis. The Ulchi Freedom Shield Exercise (UFS EX) is conducted annually from mid- to late August. It consists of the Ulchi Exercise, a government exercise based on emergency preparedness plans, and the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command Post Exercise (Freedom Shield), where the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and USFK execute operational plans at various levels to cultivate theater-level operational capabilities. Its purpose is to establish national emergency preparedness through exercises in national crisis management, wartime transition procedures, and total war mobilization in the event of war.

The Foal Eagle Exercise is an annual field maneuver exercise where the ROK military and USFK jointly evaluate rear area defense operations and key command-and-control and communications systems. The Homeland Defense Training, overseen by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and involving mobilized forces, is conducted annually as a regular exercise. Army units along the west and east coasts conduct training by forming joint forces with naval and air force assets. Combat capabilities are assessed by axis, including base occupation training and tactical maneuvers by unit. Additionally, intensive combined training is continuously conducted between ROK and U.S. Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force units. Developing joint multi-purpose live-fire ranges in addition to those for each service branch, thereby ensuring training conditions for the USFK to conduct continuous live-fire training, is also a way to maintain the combined defense posture. ROK-U.S. combined training must be conducted continuously and at a high intensity. Peace can be preserved only when a dynamic, offensive, and powerful military, with eager will to defend the homeland, stands firm. Should an armed invasion be attempted, an early counteroffensive operation will secure victory and achieve a unified Korea.

A ‘peace state where fighting is unnecessary’—one where the adversary cannot provoke—is impossible without the deterrence provided by a strong ROK-U.S. combined force, proficient in roaring strategic and tactical capabilities. It must be remembered that without training, the ROK-U.S. combined forces become a hollow shell, leading to the dissolution of the alliance. This would cause the very purpose of the USFK's presence to be lost, leaving no choice but withdrawal. It is crucial to note that a lack of training creates gaps in security, effectively inviting enemy invasion.

II. The ROK-U.S. Alliance and Peace Creation

Merely managing the unstable armistice structure cannot guarantee peace on the Korean Peninsula. Efforts must be made to transform the unstable armistice structure into a permanent peace regime. This path is achieved through arms control. A Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula refers to a system where the risk of war on the peninsula is significantly eliminated and North and South Korea coexist peacefully, based on building political, military, and economic trust between the two Koreas and resolving hostile relations among relevant countries.[10]

Furthermore, it is necessary to meticulously analyze the background and process of the armistice structure's emergence, as well as its maintenance and evolution since then, to draw lessons. Because the armistice structure was not established solely by the will of the two Koreas, it can never be resolved by their will alone. This is why the participation of the United States and China, signatories to the Armistice Agreement, is necessary.

Arms control is defined as “various forms of military cooperation between potential adversaries to limit the possibility of war, restrict the scope and destructive power of war during wartime, and reduce the political and economic opportunity costs associated with preparing for war during peacetime.”[11] The ROK Ministry of National Defense defines arms control as “all efforts to reduce, eliminate, or minimize the risks and burdens that may arise from an arms race by stabilization or institutionalization.”[12] Ultimately, arms control can be defined as “efforts to achieve various forms of cooperation among nations during peacetime in order to reduce the possibility of war and minimize damage in times of war.”[13]

Arms control is categorized into military confidence-building measures, operational arms control, and structural arms control. The first category, Military Confidence Building Measures (M-CBMs), aims for control at a more functional level. This includes mutual communication, advance notification of troop deployments and maneuver training at the operational level, exchange of prior information and data, exchange visits by military personnel, and inviting observers during military training exercises.

The second, Operational Arms Control, seeks to reduce the risk of war by controlling the deployment and operation of military forces to enhance transparency, prevent surprise attacks through mutual verification and monitoring, and thereby decrease the likelihood of conflict. This involves allowing the transparent disclosure and verification of all military activities and troop deployments to the other party, demonstrating the absence of intent for surprise attacks or war provocation, and increasing predictability.

Finally, Structural Arms Control is a form of arms control that seeks to maintain military balance and stability by controlling the actual elements constituting military power—troop strength and weapon systems—at a structural level, such as the size and organization of military forces. This includes restrictions on the construction, acquisition, and mobilization of military forces; limitations on the use of specific weapons in certain regions; or regulations on the production or transfer of weapons.[14]

When discussing arms control from the perspective of international relations theory, attention is focused on how to induce cooperation between states in conflict. It advocates converting offensive deployments into defensive ones as a means to promote international cooperation and stability. Furthermore, it posits that cooperation occurs when mutual benefits exist between states, rather than confrontation, in the realms of international security and political economy. Arms control can be achieved when agreed-upon principles, norms, and rules govern bilateral interactions. When discussing arms control from a security perspective, it develops concepts such as rational sufficiency in defense, the primacy of defense, non-offensive defense, and negotiation over strategy and tactics. It then presents policy prescriptions and alternatives, such as methods for applying these concepts to actual defense strategies and military postures.[15]

1. A situation where accidental clashes could erupt with all communication lines severed between North and South Korea

President Lee Jae Myung, after concluding his attendance at the G20 Summit in South Africa and arriving in Türkiye, the final stop on his Middle East and Africa tour, stated during a briefing with reporters aboard the presidential plane regarding the current inter-Korean situation: “There is not even the most basic level of trust, leading to extreme rhetoric and actions,” and “All lines of communication have been completely severed. They are refusing any form of dialogue or contact whatsoever.” He even remarked, “Even the most hostile nations maintain emergency communication channels or hotlines, but North Korea has completely severed all of them.” Furthermore, he noted, “The military demarcation line boundaries are interpreted differently by our side and the North, leading to situations like warning shots being fired over alleged incursions onto their territory,” adding, “We have reached a point where an accidental clash could occur at any moment.” He expressed concern, saying, “If an accidental clash occurs, there will be no way to resolve it.” President Lee emphasized, “Precisely because of this, we must exercise even greater patience, secure sufficient deterrence to suppress any provocation at any time, and then, based on that foundation, communicate, engage in dialogue, persuade, and open a path.” He added, “We must continuously convey our goodwill. If there is doubt, it is better to speak twice than once. We must persistently strive to make even the smallest breakthrough.” President Lee also noted that the Ministry of National Defense's proposal to North Korea on the 17th for military talks to establish a baseline for the Military Demarcation Line in the Demilitarized Zone was part of efforts to open channels of communication. “We must do even this. It shows we are always open,” he said.[16]

2. Principles and Strategy for Advancing Arms Control

To pursue arms control amid the complete shutdown of all inter-Korean channels, clear principles and strategies are essential. ➀ Through the formation of a Joint Military Committee, discuss and advance measures for operational and structural arms control, starting with foundational military confidence-building steps aligned with denuclearization progress. ➁ Pursue inter-Korean arms control in close prior consultation with the United Nations Command (UNC) and the United States Forces Korea (USFK). ➂ Before advancing to the next stage, evaluate the implementation of the Inter-Korean Military Agreement and proceed gradually. ➃ The Republic of Korea, North Korea, the UNC, and the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) shall monitor and verify the implementation of agreed inter-Korean arms control measures. ➄ All agreements shall be implemented transparently and publicly. ➅ Pursue arms control based on the principle of mutual threat reduction. ➆ Arms control must be pursued under the principle of national consensus.

(1) Proactive Restoration of the September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement

The September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement was signed following two rounds of inter-Korean general-level talks, eight exchanges of documents, 17 hours of marathon working-level discussions, and consultations with the United Nations Command throughout the entire process.[17] It is necessary to progressively and gradually restore the September 19 Military Agreement.

Key Provisions of the Military Agreement for Implementing the Panmunjom Declaration

Source: Chung Kyung-young, Peace Creation: The ROK-US Alliance and Peace Creation (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2020), p.217.

As seen in the Military Agreement for the Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration, Article 1 states that the South and North agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other. This includes halting artillery fire and large-scale training near the MDL, establishing a no-fly zone near the MDL, and applying joint operational procedures or ROE to prevent accidental clashes.

Article 2 stipulates that the two Koreas will consult on military measures to ensure the demilitarization of the Joint Security Area (JSA), the mutual withdrawal of Guard Posts (GP), the joint excavation of remains, and the joint investigation and excavation of historical sites. Article 3 concerns establishing a peace zone in the West Sea NLL area and ensuring safe fishing activities. To this end, the two sides agreed to prevent accidental armed clashes and cease hostile acts, and to devise measures for establishing a pilot joint fishing zone and conducting joint patrols.

Article 4 covers military guarantees for promoting exchanges, cooperation, and contacts. The two sides agreed to discuss establishing a joint utilization zone in the lower Han River estuary and resolving issues related to the Haeju direct shipping route and passage through the Jeju Strait. Finally, Article 5 addresses mutual military trust-building. It calls for establishing and operating a direct telephone line between military authorities and forming a North-South Military Joint Committee to pursue consultations on sensitive military issues, including the scope of the future peace zone and joint fishing area, and arms control.

(2) Strategy for Promoting Inter-Korean Military Trust-Building

The strategy for promoting military trust-building between the two Koreas will be pursued in a direction that enhances the security of both Koreas and strengthens military stability. However, to contribute to political trust-building, it will be implemented gradually and step-by-step, considering the level and pace of change in inter-Korean relations. Efforts will be made to build public consensus through public relations and advance notice to minimize potential internal South Korean conflicts. Furthermore, discussions and implementation will prioritize matters that both sides can easily agree upon, that South Korea can pursue independently, and that do not conflict with international norms. For example, the ROK will expand from observing disaster relief drills to conducting joint drills. The ROK will open institutions where security concerns are minimal, such as research institutes and universities, to mutual dispatches and visits, thereby strengthening human ties. The ROK will bear in mind that military confidence-building measures can serve as the cornerstone for political trust-building, and take care not to undermine the atmosphere of mutual trust during the implementation and verification stages.[18]

(3) Strategy for Promoting Disarmament Between North and South Korea

Considering past cases where disarmament or arms control proved difficult without political confidence-building measures, we will prioritize negotiating weapons and equipment that are both easily negotiable and potentially lethal to the other side. Regarding North Korea's weapons of mass destruction—specifically biological and chemical weapons—we will actively utilize international arms control mechanisms such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) rather than relying on bilateral negotiations between the two Koreas. Matters related to nuclear weapons and missiles will be addressed through the international framework centered on the United States.[19]

Whenever possible, proceed under the principle of direct inter-Korean engagement, excluding U.S. Forces Korea, while taking care to avoid friction through consultation with neighboring countries. Where feasible, establish a Northeast Asia multilateral security cooperation consultative regime to incentivize regional nations to act as positive factors in Korean Peninsula disarmament. Verification should utilize international specialized agencies such as the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as third countries to include India, to ensure credibility and preemptively eliminate the potential for unnecessary misunderstandings between the two Koreas.[20]

(4) Direction for Advancing Arms Control

The proposed direction for advancing arms control going forward, in the order of additional military confidence-building measures, operational arms control, and structural arms control, is as follows.

Direction of Military Arms Control Efforts by Field

Source: Chung Kyung-young, Peace Creation: The ROK-US Alliance and Peace Creation (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2020), p.241.

First, as an additional military confidence-building measure, the inter-Korean general-level talks and military working-level meetings held to date will be regularized. ROK will also hold inter-Korean defense ministerial talks and institutionalize them to continuously discuss pending issues. Furthermore, ROK will establish and operate an inter-Korean military joint committee with the South Korean Vice Minister of National Defense and the North Korean Vice Minister of the Ministry of National Defense serving as co-chairs. ROK will promote mutual notification and observation of large-scale exercises. For military personnel exchanges, ROK will form and exchange mutual visitation delegations and promote exchange and cooperation between the Korea National Defense University and the Kim Il Sung Military University. ROK will promote inter-Korean military Taekwondo and soccer matches.

In the field of operational arms control, cease hostile acts in cyberspace, restrict large-scale military activities and training, conduct joint maritime search and rescue exercise, cooperate in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations such as earthquakes, heavy snow, floods, and wildfires, and exchange military intelligence to disclose each other's command structures, troop deployments and sizes, combat equipment, defense policies, unit planning, and modernization plans.

Structural arms control measures include dismantling North Korea's nuclear weapons, eliminating its chemical and biological weapons, and restricting short-range missile units. To prevent surprise attacks, offensive weapons and units such as long-range artillery, special forces, tanks, and mechanized units will be relocated to rear areas. The North Korean military consists of tactical units, operational units, and strategic reserves. The First Echelon comprises tactical units, with four forward infantry corps reinforced with artillery deployed. The Second Echelon comprises operational units, with two mechanized corps and one artillery division deployed. Strategic reserves consist of ground forces from two mechanized corps, naval and air force units, and strategic forces comprising nuclear and missile units.[21]

The forward-deployed units can launch attacks without warning. Considering the capitals of both Koreas, the North Korean forces, which have a deep operational depth, should be redeployed 40-60km, while South Korean forces should be relocated 20-30km. Long-range artillery threatening the capital region should be relocated to the rear, and tunnel artillery positions should be closed.

Troop reductions are a matter that can be pursued at the end of structural arms control, but troop reductions between the South and North Korean armies carry significant symbolic weight as a visible measure of easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula, making them feasible to pursue proactively. ROK military aims to recruit 470,000 personnel by the end of 2024, maintaining a level of 500,000 recruited by 50,000 women soldiers by 2030. The North Korean military also needs to reduce its forces by 480,000 from its current 1.28 million, maintaining a level of 800,000. The Chinese military's downsizing provides significant implications for the North Korean military as well.[22] If North and South Korea achieve structural arms control, North Korea could reduce its defense spending[23]—which currently consumes 25% of its GDP—to around 5%. This would signify a systemic transformation enabling greater focus on the civilian economy.

During the peace regime building phase, USFK will play a role in deterring potential military provocations and consolidating the peace regime. After unification, USFK will prevent military intervention on the Korean Peninsula by neighboring countries and serve as a regional stabilizer.

2. Signing of a Korean Peninsula Peace Agreement

When economic exchange and cooperation between North and South Korea are activated, political integration and socio-cultural integration are achieved, and structural arms control is implemented, South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China can conclude a Korean Peninsula peace agreement to establish a peace regime on the peninsula. The peace agreement should include: ① Explicit termination of hostile relations and the state of war, and restoration of a state of peace; ② Mutual non-aggression and renunciation of the use of force; ③ Mutual respect for the border line; ④ Transforming the Demilitarized Zone into a peace zone, ⑤ Peaceful resolution of disputes, ⑥ War responsibility issues, ⑦ Compensation and reparations issues, ⑧ Recognition and respect for the special relationship between North and South Korea, and ⑨ Implementation and practice of the Inter-Korean Basic Agreement.[24]

Upon the conclusion of a peace agreement, the Military Armistice Commission could be transformed into a peace agreement monitoring body through a new resolution by the UN Security Council. This monitoring body could be composed of 10 members: 5 from the UN Command side (US, UK, South Korea, and 14 UN participating nations on a rotating basis, and Secretary of General for UNC) and 5 from the communist side Military Armistice Commission (North Korea and China).

A change in the role of USFK after the conclusion of a peace agreement is inevitable. Given that neighboring countries may question the justification for USFK's presence, clear role division and coordination are necessary. USFK will serve as a preventer against North Korean provocations until Korean unification, as a coordinator managing internal Korean Peninsula affairs during the unification process, and as a balancer within the regional security architecture after unification.[25]

III. Policy Proposal

In the current situation where all contacts between North and South Korea are severed, crisis management by the ROK-U.S. alliance poses a major challenge. The United Nations Command (UNC), which exercises jurisdiction over the DMZ, must take action against North Korea's frequent incursions across the Military Demarcation Line. The UNC, not the Ministry of National Defense, should propose military talks to the North Korean side. The Chinese and North Korean military delegations, which withdrew from the Military Armistice Commission, should return to the Commission and manage the armistice structure alongside the UNC. Furthermore, localized provocation operations should be conducted according to the ‘Joint Local Provocation Contingency Plan’ agreed upon in 2013 by the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command. Crisis management, part of the Combined Operational Deployment Authority (CODA) exercised by the Combined Forces Commander, should be transferred to the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff at an early stage, even before the transition of wartime operational control.

Transforming the Korean Peninsula, the epicenter of conflict and confrontation, into a foundation for peace and shared prosperity requires extraordinary government strategy, public support, the resolve of our military, and cooperation with allies. By creating peace through risk reduction—including military confidence-building, operational arms control, and structural arms control—a peace agreement between South Korea, North Korea, the United States, and China will establish a Korean Peninsula peace regime.

The ROK-US alliance has played a decisive role in building a prosperous, free Republic of Korea. When the alliance evolves from merely deterring war on the peninsula to pursuing the vision of a unified, free Korea, the North Korean nuclear issue will be resolved, and we will be liberated from the specter of war. It is projected that if the two Koreas unify without squandering national energy on conflict, the synergy between North Korea's resources and labor force and South Korea's capital and technology will propel the unified nation to surpass Japan and Germany by 2050, becoming the world's third-largest economy.[26]

This study proposes establishing a new ‘ROK-U.S. Korean Unification Consultative Commission’ directly under the President to develop the vision for a unified Korea and formulate unification strategies into policy, enabling the realization of such a unified Korea. ■ 

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Woodward, Bob, Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).

[1] Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, 『2022 Defense White Paper』 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2023), p.352,

[2] Ministry of National Defense Proposes Inter-Korean Military Talks for First Time in 7 Years... “Let's Discuss Setting the MDL Baseline,” NEWSIS, November 17, 2025.

[3] Victor Cha and Andy Lim, “Garbage, Balloons, and Korean Unification Values.” Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS). Nov. 26. 2025, https://www.csis.org/ analysis/garbageballoons-and-korean-unification-values.

[4] UN Command: “Loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea provide pretext for additional balloon launches of waste... violating the Armistice Agreement,” The Korea Herald, October 21, 2024.

[5] Lee Myung-bak, The President's Time, 2008-2013 (Seoul: 2015), pp. 346-348.

[6] Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), p.497: The initial South Korean plan to retaliate against North Korea's shelling of Yeonpyeong Island, involving fighter jets and artillery, was aggressive and disproportionate, raising concerns that such engagement risked escalation. Consequently, U.S. President Obama, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates all telephoned their South Korean counterparts. Accordingly, only artillery was used to respond to the North Korean artillery positions that initiated the shelling.

[7] The Committee for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity, a North Korea-related civic group, has decided to file a complaint with the International Criminal Court (ICC) against North Korean leader Kim Jong-il and his successor Kim Jong-un (Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers' Party) on charges including ‘war crimes’ in connection with North Korea's artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island. “Committee for the Investigation of Crimes Against Humanity to File Complaint Against Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un with International Criminal Court,” Yonhap News, December 28, 2010.

[8] “U.S. Forces to Automatically Intervene in North Korean Local Provocations,” Maeil Business Newspaper, March 24, 2013: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chung Sung-jo and ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command Commander James Thurman signed the ‘ROK-U.S. Joint Local Provocation Contingency Plan’ on March 22, 2013.

[9] Bob Woodward, Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2020).

[10] Chung Kyung-young, Peace Creation: The ROK-US Alliance and Peace Making (Paju: Hanul Academy, 2020), pp.150-348; Chung Kyung-young, Security Challenges and Resolve Toward a Unified Korea (Seoul: Knowledge and Sensibility, 2017), pp.289-290.

[11] Thomas C. Schelling & Morton Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Perggamon-Brassry’s Classic, 1961), p.142.

[12] Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, What is Arms Control? (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1992), p. 6.

[13] Kim Yeol-su, National Security (Seoul: Beopmunsa, 2010), p. 312.

[14] Kim Yeol-su, National Security (Seoul: Beopmunsa, 2010), pp. 315-316.

[15] Han Yong-seop, Peace on the Korean Peninsula and Arms Control (Seoul: Parkyoungsa, 2004), pp. 174-183.

[16] President Lee: “North and South are completely cut off... We must find even the smallest opening,” Yonhap News, November 17, 2025.

[17] Chung Kyung-young, “Misunderstandings and Truths Regarding the Military Agreement for Implementing the Panmunjom Declaration,” Sejong Institute, Situation and Policy, No. 12 (October 11, 2018).

[18] Lee Pyo-gyu, “Measures for Realizing Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula,” in Chung Kyung-young, Han Kwan-soo, Lee Pyo-gyu, and Ha Jeong-yeol, Strategies for Promoting a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula, Policy Research Project for the National Assembly Defense Committee, December 19, 2018.

[19] Kim Jae-cheol, “Directions for Promoting Arms Control in the Context of Establishing a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula,” The Korean Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 48 (2008), p. 275.

[20] Lee Pyo-gyu, “Measures for Realizing Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula,” in Chung Kyung-young, Han Kwan-soo, Lee Pyo-gyu, and Ha Jeong-yeol, Strategies for Promoting a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula, Policy Research Project for the National Assembly Defense Committee, December 19, 2018.

[21] Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, The 2022 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 2023), pp. 26–32.

[22] The Chinese military pursued troop reductions as part of its military-civilian integration strategy. The Chinese People's Liberation Army, which numbered 5 million in 1950, has been reduced to 2 million today. China's experience—reducing its military from 4.238 million in 1985 to 2.3 million in 2005, and to 2.1 million between 2015 and 2018—while providing jobs, severance pay and pensions, facilitating repatriation and resettlement, and converting defense factories and enterprises into civilian entities—holds significant implications for North Korea.

[23] Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook 2025-2026 (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2025), p.500.

[24] Ha Jeong-yeol, “Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Cooperation and Resolution of South-South Conflict,” Jeong Kyung-young, Han Kwan-soo, Lee Pyo-gu, Ha Jeong-yeol, Strategy for Promoting a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula, Policy Research Project for the National Assembly Defense Committee, December 19, 2018.

[25] “U.S.-South Korea Alliance Must Prevent North Korean Provocations and Become Regional Security Leader After Unification,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 29, 2015.

[26] Goldman Sachs. “A United Korea? Reassessing North Korea Risks (Part I).” September 21. 2009.

■ Kyung-young CHUNG is a Professor at the Hanyang University Graduate School of International Studies.

■ Translated and edited by Inhwan OH, EAI Senior Research Fellow; Sangjun LEE, EAI Research Associate
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