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The Victory Day parade in Beijing (September 3) and the Tianjin summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (August 31 to September 1) merit our attention as the events underscored a visible challenge to the U.S.-led liberal international order. The Tianjin summit, the largest since the SCO's inception, convened leaders from over 20 nations and 10 international organizations. The presence of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi drew significant scrutiny, leading to widespread debate on the future of India's foreign policy, particularly given the context of ongoing tariff pressure from the Trump administration. The United States had imposed an additional 25% tariff on India for its import of Russian crude oil, raising the aggregate rate to 50%. Sino-Indian relations have been fraught with tension, primarily stemming from unresolved territorial disputes. However, New Delhi has been signaling a shift toward a balanced diplomacy by cooperating with China amid tensions in U.S.-India relations. The Tianjin summit accentuated China and Russia’s intention to establish a new multipolar system challenging the existing international order. The Tianjin Declaration of the summit expressed their resistance against the U.S.-centric international order, signaling India’s potential participation in the anti-Western coalition.

India’s decision to not participate in the Victory Day parade likely stems from New Delhi’s considerations of its future relations with the United States and Japan as a member of the Quad. India’s interpretation of its history may have played a role, as it does not necessarily align with China's perspective. Nevertheless, the Victory Day parade, following the Tianjin summit, prompts significant interest as a comprehensive presentation of an alternative to the U.S.-led international order. The leaders of nations representing half the world's population attended these two events. Despite the participation of many democracies, the leadership of the authoritarian great powers of China and Russia, alongside North Korea, displays a stark contrast to the coalition of liberal democracies. Furthermore, the participation of leaders from five of the world's nine nuclear-weapon states carries substantial military ramifications. Iran's attendance, given its status as a nuclear threshold state, also warrants particular scrutiny.

Whereas past authoritarian coalitions were largely confined to abstract principles or political rhetoric, these two China-led events demonstrate that the coalition of authoritarian states is moving beyond mere diplomatic slogans. The events display a consolidation of a substantive, alternative axis in global governance. The Chinese weapons displayed in the military parade underscored that this authoritarian coalition can be underpinned by formidable military power. China showed that it is no longer a follower of the United States in the production of advanced weaponry but is transitioning into a frontrunner in weapon innovations.

Nevertheless, the respective visions of these nations for the world order and their specific national interests have yet to fully converge. Russia declared the arrival of a new global order, vehemently criticizing the existing Euro-centric order. This assertion is reminiscent of President Vladimir Putin's announcement of a “new world order” during his visit to Beijing in February 2022. As an extension of that announcement, Russia has justified the war in Ukraine as a legitimate response to European support for the Ukrainian "coup." The endorsement of this logic by many leaders reveals that the authoritarian coalition is not mere diplomatic rhetoric. The authoritarian coalition is instead a substantive consolidation that fundamentally challenges the legitimacy of the existing international order. China also emphasized its opposition to U.S.-centric unilateralism and advocated for a fairer and more equal multipolar order. On the other hand, unlike Moscow, Beijing has not explicitly rejected the fundamental norms of the current international order, such as respect for other states' sovereignty and nuclear non-proliferation. To rise as a future leader of the international order, China is emphasizing international organizations including the United Nations, embracing existing international norms, and strengthening its image of exercising more legitimate leadership than the U.S.

China has maintained a reserved stance toward Russia's invasion of Ukraine and has not explicitly rejected international sanctions against North Korea's nuclear weapons development. Despite predictions of advancement in the North Korea-China-Russia trilateral relationship, China resorted to bilateral talks with North Korea and Russia while refraining from trilateral talks or the institutionalization of the trilateral relationship. China has prioritized enhancing its strategic position vis-à-vis the United States, while also spearheading the emergence of a new world order by convening a bloc of states that share China’s vision and interests and reliant on China's support. This initiative suggests that the authoritarian coalition is developing into an international political order buttressed by military capabilities. Should this coalition continue to compete militarily with the U.S.-led liberal coalition, we will be entering a situation where an overwhelming U.S. victory is no longer a certainty.

U.S. Strategy of Hegemonic Readjustment and Future Uncertainty

The United States is currently pursuing a strategy of hegemonic readjustment. On the one hand, Washington is restoring the economic foundations of its hegemony; on the other, it is adjusting its priorities in overseas intervention to solidify its leadership. However, these two-pronged shifts are, paradoxically, undermining the foundations of the international order. The reorganization of the liberal order centered on U.S. unipolar hegemony has resulted in the exacerbation of the entire order's instability. U.S. strategy is driven by three coexisting and not necessarily cooperative logics. The first is the logic of the U.S. military and strategic community, which seeks to maintain U.S. hegemony while securing global influence. This strategy strives to solidify U.S. military hegemony, pursuing the Indo-Pacific Strategy and the active countering of China while emphasizing U.S. alliances. The second is the economic logic led by President Donald Trump. The strategy attempts to rebuild the economic foundations of U.S. hegemony and to secure economic hegemony through tariffs, increased domestic investment, and investment in emerging technologies. While this approach values the economy as the foundation of military power, the logic often appears to conflict with the first logic due to the pressure it places on allies. The third logic stems from President Trump's personal perspective. The logic views international relations as a business enterprise, prioritizing economic interests over the traditional instruments of diplomacy and war. Conflict resolution is often approached through unconventional calculations. Personal achievements and agendas, such as winning a Nobel Prize, serve as important motivations.

Depending on the future success or failure of this hegemonic readjustment strategy, several predictions could be made about the future of the U.S.-led order. First is a scenario where the U.S. recovers its economic foundation and restores the unipolar liberal order. Second is one where liberal states, excluding the U.S., cooperate to build a multilateral liberal order. Third is a scenario where the U.S. embraces the multilateral liberal order while evolving the order to become more dispersed in responsibility and authority. This third scenario can be assessed as the most desirable path.

Apart from the future of the liberal camp, another scenario gaining traction is the establishment of a non-liberal order excluding the U.S. As the Victory Day parade displays, there is an emerging trend of authoritarian states including China and Russia spearheading the formation of a hierarchical and exclusive order with the facade of multilateralism. The order’s intermediate stage could ostensibly advocate for multilateralism. However, in reality, the paths of formation could converge toward an authoritarian order.

Ultimately, a multi-topos world of coexisting, different orders with different, long-term historical backgrounds may arrive without the establishment of a single, unified order. Each order will reflect its own historical context and ideological foundation and is likely to evolve into a regionalized form of topos that goes beyond a simple international order.

The Future of the North Korean Nuclear Problem amidst the Authoritarian Coalition and South Korea's Response

Kim Jong Un's presence in the Victory Day parade underscores the increasing importance of the North Korean issue amidst the ongoing transformation of the international order. The implication of North Korea's participation is not limited to its bilateral relationship with China or the trilateral relationship with China and Russia. This demonstrates North Korea's participation in an emerging coalition of states to establish an international order that challenges the United States. While democracies are suffering from domestic backsliding and standing by as the liberal international order declines, a paradoxical phenomenon is emerging where authoritarian and dictatorial states are instead advocating for the "democratization of the international order," positioning themselves as guardians of legitimacy and equality. North Korea is bound to be emboldened in this framework and will become convinced that it is a legitimate member of the new order. North Korea will strive to spread the perception that it is an indispensable ally within the authoritarian coalition, rather than engage in negotiations with South Korea and the U.S. Pyongyang will likely focus its diplomatic efforts on improving its strategic standing within the coalition's hierarchy.

North Korea may perceive that the mere acquiescence of China and Russia would not legitimize its possession of nuclear weapons. Instead, Pyongyang could anticipate the deterioration of the non-proliferation regime, nullifying international sanctions and the discourse of illegality. This may lead Pyongyang to conclude that UN sanctions could be reconsidered under a new normative framework, creating an opportunity to secure both an enhanced international status and practical gains through its membership in the authoritarian coalition. North Korean diplomacy is poised to adopt a more aggressive posture, characterized by the parallel pursuit of nuclear armament and economic development within the authoritarian coalition.

In light of these developments, the fundamental premises underpinning North Korean denuclearization are likely to be significantly undermined. The traditional approach to North Korean denuclearization rested upon the premise that the goal was justified in principle by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) regime. This premise was, in turn, supported by a set of expectations: that UN sanctions would be maintained, that China would largely acquiesce to this framework, and that the easing of U.S.-China relations would facilitate Beijing's cooperation on the issue. However, these premises will no longer be tenable if the framework of the liberal international order weakens and the authoritarian coalition gains momentum. Ultimately, the North Korean nuclear problem is shifting from the purview of arms reduction or denuclearization negotiations to an issue within the fundamental reshaping of the international order.

The widespread endorsement at the Victory Day parade of Putin's rationale—which attributes the Ukraine invasion to Western support for a "coup"—suggests that North Korea may anticipate similar validation for its own justifications from the international community. This expectation provides the basis for North Korea to strengthen its strategic position within the new global governance and to justify its possession of nuclear weapons as a legitimate means of self-defense.

Although there are forecasts that a Trump-style "small deal" could become a stepping stone to the resolution of the North Korean nuclear problem, an immediate optimism is premature. Trump's diplomacy, akin to a business transaction, suffers from its disregard of diplomacy and military force, the essential instruments of international politics. Even if a small deal is reached, the deal is unlikely to fundamentally transform the strategic environment of the Korean Peninsula. Instead, there could be significant repercussions such as fragmentation in domestic politics or the suspension of joint military exercises.

Amid these structural changes, South Korea must bear in mind that its denuclearization efforts are unlikely to succeed through inter-Korean or U.S.-DPRK bilateral approaches alone. North Korea is elevating its strategic position within global governance. According to the trajectory of the liberal order, Pyongyang is calibrating its advancement of nuclear weapon and diplomatic posture. Therefore, South Korea must first consider what kind of vision it will present for the future international order and how it will steer the overall diplomatic dynamics. Through its relationship with the U.S. and solidarity with liberal states, Seoul must monitor the authoritarian coalition and pursue a strategy to mitigate conflict through an ideal international order. On that basis, Seoul must meticulously calculate the possibility of North Korean denuclearization.

North Korea’s current doctrine of “two hostile states" may stand for now. However, it is also possible that the shift in international order and the balance of power between blocs would bring about the doctrinal change again. Grounded on the superiority of the authoritarian coalition, North Korea could restart its unification campaign toward the South. An enhancement in Pyongyang’s military might, state capacity, and diplomatic influence will change its approach toward Seoul.

Ultimately, North Korea's vision for unification is established upon the balance of power. Rather than being swayed by Pyongyang, South Korea must track the future course of the international order and independently formulate its strategy for the Peninsula’s future and unification. The South Korean government's policy must adjust the issues of denuclearization and unification from a long-term and structural perspective amid the changes in the international order. The imperative is to move beyond short-term fixes and formulate a proactive, independent strategic vision for the international order and unification to which South Korea aspires. ■ 

■ Chaesung CHUN is the President of EAI and a Professor at Seoul National University.

■ Translated and Edited by Inhwan OH, Senior Research Fellow; Jonghyuk CHUNG, Researcher, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
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