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A Lowered Threshold for Contact

The constitution of the Republic of Korea sets unification as the nation’s ultimate goal, and the subjects of this goal are the residents of North Korea. Paradoxically, however, a procedure has required a resident of South Korea to file a report with the Minister of Unification before contacting a resident of North Korea. This “North Korean Resident Contact Report” system was introduced with the enactment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act on August 1, 1990. The law stipulated that South Korean residents shall report to the Minister of Unification prior to any direct or indirect contact with North Korean residents. This ‘contact’ includes not only face-to-face meetings but also non-face-to-face methods such as phone calls, emails, and online messages, and covers private meetings as well as academic, cultural, and economic exchanges. [1]

On July 30, 2025, the Ministry of Unification abolished the “Guidelines for Processing Reports on Contact with North Korean Residents,” which had been the substantive basis for the system's operation. These guidelines contained detailed clauses enabling the rejection of reports based on the character of the contacted individual or the applicant. In practice, the guidelines turned the reporting system into a de facto permit system, entrenching the practice of restraining private-sector contact with the North. Minister of Unification Chung Dongyoung called the system a wrongful procedure restricting the sovereignty of the people. Chung stated, “Free contact among people breeds mutual understanding, and mutual understanding fosters coexistence.” Following the guideline’s abolition, Chung announced his intention to pursue a revision of related legislation to prevent the reporting system’s reversion to a permit-based one in future administrations. [2] This policy shift institutionally guarantees the freedom of contact. It is also a symbolic measure that could facilitate private-sector exchanges.

This change carries several important implications. By enabling free contact in various sectors including academia, religion, culture, arts, and non-profit organizations, activities previously blocked by the approval process may now be possible with a report. Should this vitalize inter-Korean exchanges in the private sector, we could also anticipate a shift in socio-cultural perceptions between the two Koreas. However, not all changes are positive. As the policy lowers the threshold for contact, the expansion of legalized contact could also introduce new risks to material exchange, the sharing of sensitive information, and political statements. The abolition of the guidelines is a testament to a return to the reporting system’s original function, while rejecting the permit-based operation. On the other hand, it simultaneously presents the challenge of re-examining the scope and definition of ‘North Korean residents’ and the boundaries of ‘contact.’

Expanded Opportunities

The abolition of the “Guidelines for Processing Reports on Contact with North Korean Residents” marks a significant turning point in the operation of the inter-Korean exchange and cooperation system, heralding substantial change. The guidelines, which existed separately from the law, had restricted academic, media, and cultural exchanges through ambiguous language and arbitrary interpretations. With their abolition, it is expected that judgments would be made based solely on the requirements stipulated by law, easing the rigidity of interpretation.

The most significant change would be the revitalization of civilian exchange. In the past, even informal encounters between South and North Korean individuals at overseas academic conferences, international meetings, or multilateral cultural events were subject to prior approval or post-facto reporting under the guidelines. Henceforth, contact in non-political sectors could become increasingly flexible. This could contribute to maintaining channels for non-political exchange even during periods of strained inter-Korean relations.

We could anticipate positive changes in academic and research activities. Researchers studying North Korea have often faced institutional constraints when participating in events hosted by overseas academia or international organizations to secure primary sources, or when attempting to directly interview figures from Chongryon (the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) or North Korea. Following the abolition, the researchers could now follow safe and predictable procedures within the legal boundaries, improving academic freedom and the research environment.

The scope of media and NGO activities is also likely to expand. For issues where on-site presence and credibility are crucial, such as North Korean human rights, reunions of separated families, and humanitarian aid in border regions, securing direct testimony and records is essential for policy design and shaping of international public opinion. The abolition of the guidelines lowers the institutional barriers to on-site reporting and data collection, and could also strengthen joint projects with international NGOs.

The ‘Likelihood Clause’ Remains

The expansion of freedom of contact also brings side effects. Unofficial contacts in third countries could be exploited as channels for intelligence transfer. In the humanitarian aid sector, structural vulnerabilities still restrict verification procedures, which further limit public access and monitoring. This fosters risks for humanitarian cooperative projects for the North. Furthermore, a structural problem could deepen where private networks becoming a form of informal power, or certain groups monopolizing information and networks related to North Korea. In humanitarian aid projects, there have been numerous cases where North Korea exploited its preference for unofficial private channels over official ones. This led to situations where civil organizations were unable to confirm the actual delivery of aid items and compromised the transparency of the projects. These blind spots could become breeding grounds for illegal activities.

A fundamental problem is that the ambiguity of the legal provisions still allows for an expansive interpretation. In particular, legal uncertainties remain even after the abolition of the guidelines. Significant concerns remain that the absence of clear criteria could cause administrative agencies’ passive decision-making or avoidance of political responsibilities. Article 9 of the current Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act still stipulates a “Likelihood of undermining inter-Korean exchange and cooperation” or “Likelihood of harming national security, maintenance of order and public welfare” as a comprehensive reason to cancel the approval of contact. Although intended for special cases, this is practically no different from a restriction. Such abstraction leaves room to justify ambiguity and arbitrary judgment.

Of particular note is the change in North Korea's external strategy following its adoption of the “two hostile states” doctrine. In the past, North Korea had strictly managed the nationality and status of Chongryon members. Recently, on the other hand, the North has moved to recruit even South Korean nationals. These moves have included organizing "homeland visit" delegations including South Korean nationals or inviting them to commemorative events and cultural exchange programs for Korean residents in Japan. This trend could be interpreted as a strategic maneuver to expand its human network based on political attitudes and activities.

These changes could introduce new variables into determining what qualifies as contact. In the past, North Korean nationality or Korean domicile (Chōsen-seki) had been a key criterion. Now, regardless of nationality, the new factors of political stances, history of activities, and affiliated networks are emerging as criteria of legal interpretation and application. The interpretation of ‘North Korean resident’ is no longer confined within clear boundaries. In a situation where the guidelines for reporting contact have been abolished, this strategic shift by the North could rapidly change the criteria for contact. A clear response from a legal perspective is needed to maintain the safety and transparency of inter-Korean exchange.

While the guidelines had been criticized for their overly comprehensive stipulations, the administration still holds the authority to cancel the approval even after the guideline’s abolition. The same types of contacts could be dealt differently depending on political and diplomatic situations and interpretations from the officials in charge. More important than the existence of the guidelines is the specification of legal standards. The liberalization of contact could be an opportunity to increase the flexibility of inter-Korean relations, but expansion on unclear standards could foster new conflicts and distrust. Without a sober internal reassessment and institutional overhaul, the same problems are likely to recur.

For substantial institutional improvement, the legal grounds for the cancellation of approval must be specified, replacing ambiguous wordings with empirical and objective requirements. Stipulating criteria for judgment—such as the purpose, content, means of contact, and the actual role of the counterpart—could enhance consistency and predictability. The 'likelihood clause’ in Article 9, Paragraph 7, Subparagraphs 3 and 4 of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act is broad and vague. It could be exploited as a basis for arbitrary interpretation and enforcement by administrative agencies, unnecessary expansion of policy discretion, and avoidance of responsibility by working-level officials. Therefore, the uncertain wording of ‘likelihood clause’ should be revised or removed, and there should be supplementary provisions to respond to new types of threats. For instance, the rejection of a report could be limited to cases where there is a risk of provoking an armed conflict between South and North Korea, or where the subject of contact has been identified by judicial authorities as a spy or agent, or is a member of an organization banned by a court ruling. Exceptions should be made for humanitarian aid, academic research, and religious and cultural exchanges to ensure the autonomy of civilian activities.

Who Are We Meeting?

To ensure the effectiveness of the reporting system, public awareness campaigns are essential to encourage voluntary compliance. In the past, awareness of the purpose and procedures of the system was low, hindering the formation of social trust. [3] Therefore, consistent application and enforcement of the law, along with clear procedural guidance, are of paramount importance. Society as a whole must share the understanding that the reporting system is not merely an administrative procedure but a mechanism that guarantees national security, civil safety, and the sustainability of civilian exchange.

The recent abolition of the “Guidelines for Processing Reports on Contact with North Korean Residents” is both a deregulation and an opportunity for institutional reorganization. To bring about tangible results, the system must be operated based on legal specificity, transparent procedures, and public awareness. Inter-Korean cooperation should not be about unconditionally lifting barriers, but about institutionalizing mutual trust. For the freedom of contact to not end as a short-term achievement, this change must be the starting point for building a new cooperative order and an institutional safety net. When the change is stably established, contact would no longer be a risk but an asset of trust and coexistence. Now that the door to inter-Korean relations has opened, our society must find the answer together to the questions of whom we are meeting, and why. ■ 

References

김예슬, 「정동영 통일장관 '대북 민간접촉 전면 허용… 제한지침 폐지'」, 뉴스1, 2025. 7. 31, https://www.news1.kr/diplomacy/unikorea/5865009

법제처 국가법령정보센터, 「남북교류협력에 관한 법률」, https://www.law.go.kr

통일부 남북교류협력시스템, 「북한주민접촉 안내」, https://www.tongtong.go.kr

[1] 통일부 남북교류협력시스템, 「북한주민접촉 안내」, https://www.tongtong.go.kr

[2] 김예슬, 「정동영 통일장관 '대북 민간접촉 전면 허용… 제한지침 폐지'」, 뉴스1, 2025. 7. 31, https://www.news1.kr/diplomacy/unikorea/5865009

[3] 법제처 국가법령정보센터, 「남북교류협력에 관한 법률」, https://www.law.go.kr

■ Seunghee HA is a Research Professor at the Institute for North Korean Studies of Dongguk University.

■ Edited by Inhwan OH, Senior Research Fellow; Jong Hyuk CHUNG, Researcher, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
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