There are several methods to anticipate North Korea’s responses to South Korea’s policies toward the North. Understanding North Korea’s strategic culture is one of these methods. It offers insight into the possibility that North Korea may formulate its policies based on a framework of thought fundamentally different from that of South Korea. This insight provides a crucial starting point for preventing the errors in judgment and risks that could arise from the presumption that North Korea devises and pursues its strategies based on the same hierarchy of value preferences (e.g., preserving peace, economic growth, public welfare) as South Korea.

Defining Strategic Culture

The concept of 'strategic culture' remains contested. This paper defines strategic culture as the set of enduring ideas and habitual patterns of behavior related to the “role and efficacy of the use of military force in political relations between states,” which do not change in the short-to-medium term. [1] [2] Strategic culture functions partly as a context for policy decisions and partly as a lens for perceiving and judging situations, thereby shaping and providing a menu of policy options available to an actor. [3] North Korea's strategic culture was influenced by Soviet/Russian and Chinese strategic cultures, additionally shaped by the doctrinization of lessons from its experience in the inter-Korean security competition of the past 80 years, and coupled with its domestic political needs and indigenous elements, all of which have been molded into a popular narrative.

Basic Framework: Hard Realpolitik

The core of North Korea's strategic culture is hard realpolitik. The content of North Korea's various security-related documents, when synthesized to form an ideal type of its strategic culture, can be summarized in the following narrative:

The state of belligerence between the two Koreas is a persistent condition due to the extremely greedy and threatening nature of South Korea and the United States. The security threat they pose cannot be resolved without the destruction of these enemy states or their capitulation. In other words, North Korea's security is guaranteed only through superiority in military readiness, the use of violence, and the destruction or capitulation of its enemies. This ultimate goal can only be achieved when strategic conditions are ripe. North Korea's security strategy must be formulated and executed with extreme flexibility to create these conditions. In particular, a flexible strategy must be employed by calculating the opportunities and risks arising from changes in the political character of the South Korean and U.S. administrations and the shifting balance of power between North Korea and the ROK-U.S. alliance. The optimal approach is to subdue South Korea and the U.S. through a coercive strategy based on superior power and the offensive use of military force. However, when North Korea’s relative power is weaker, it pursues less coercive and more conciliatory strategies as an interim measure until its power position is restored.

Five Implications of North Korean Strategic Culture

First, within North Korea's logical framework, the distinction between offense and defense is meaningless, and all actions are justified as defensive. North Korea's basic logic is, "We will not attack unless we are attacked. But if attacked, we will certainly retaliate." However, the antecedent logic underpinning this claim is the extreme exaggeration of the adversary's aggressiveness, which shifts the responsibility for escalation to a "state of war" onto the other side. Under this premise, the aggressive use of force, including a preemptive strike and a war of aggression, is justified as an act of defense. Consequently, the North Korean concept of defense is highly offensive. Its doctrine of "two hostile states" serves as an example. According to this doctrine, the origin of security instability on the Korean Peninsula is the United States' aggressive war-mongering, which has already brought the peninsula to the brink of war. This situational framing justifies a North Korean preemptive strike, and the annihilation, subjugation, and annexation of South Korea with nuclear weapons in the event of an "accidental war," all as defensive measures.

Second, during a crisis, North Korea seeks to induce the adversary's submission by maximizing their fear of war. This is achieved by drastically exaggerating the risk of accidental war and demonstrating Pyongyang's own resolve to endure such a conflict. North Korea has accumulated significant experience and is well-practiced in the art of threat exaggeration and feigning a high tolerance for the risk of war. This belligerent disposition, combined with the ROK-U.S. alliance's tendency to avoid armed conflict and war, and in part, a pacifist streak in some quarters, creates an environment favorable for North Korea to control the escalatory situation. Considering that crises between nuclear states are fundamentally a "competition in risk-taking," this could serve as an advantage for North Korea in future nuclear crisis bargaining. This behavior is habitually repeated in North Korea's so-called "brinkmanship" policy.

Third, North Korea engages in negotiations for two primary purposes. In the short-to-medium term tactical dimension, it uses negotiations to buy time. This alleviates external pressure and builds up its own strength when it is weak and when external pressure is daunting, until the situation turns in its favor. In the long-term strategic dimension, negotiations and agreements are aimed at institutionalizing its improved strategic position, gained through its struggles up to that point, with the adversary's acknowledgment, thereby structuring a superior position for future confrontations. For instance, from North Korea’s perspective, the various documents that emerged from the North Korean denuclearization negotiations over the past 30 years were signed for this purpose. Indeed, inter-Korean and U.S.-DPRK nuclear agreements have, over time, been incrementally structured to North Korea's advantage, reflecting its advancements in nuclear capabilities.

Fourth, strategic deception and perception manipulation are key aspects of North Korean strategic culture. Strategic deception aims to shape the adversary's perceptions, morale, and policy choices by disseminating a distorted image of reality and manipulating perceptions, thereby facilitating the achievement of one's own goals. Perception manipulation is a method of strategic deception. Also known by the Russian term ‘reflexive control,’ it is an act that involves manipulating an adversary’s perception of reality in such a way that they unknowingly act in ways that benefit one’s own side while being unaware that their actions are self-detrimental. For example, according to North Korea, the Korean War was an invasion of the North by the South. In public statements in 1992 and 1994, Kim Il-sung publicly affirmed that North Korea was not developing nuclear weapons. Subsequently, a number of major South Korean political leaders asserted for some time that "North Korea has neither the will nor the capability to develop nuclear weapons" or that "North Korea's nuclear weapons are for defensive purposes." Not the least, in the late 1980s and 1990s, and to a lesser extent even today, Juche ideology has exerted a significant influence on progressive students and intellectuals in South Korea.

Fifth, extreme flexibility in strategy formulation and execution is integral in North Korean strategic culture. Leaders choose policies by continuously calculating the changing nature of the adversary, the shifting balance of power, and the corresponding risks and opportunities. During periods of relative weakness, North Korea pursues cautious policies that are non-provocative and non-confrontational. However, this posture is purely a matter of tactical convenience to avoid excessive pressure from the adversary while buying time to build strength. When the balance of power shifts in its favor, North Korea's policy becomes confrontational and offensive. For example, while many Western experts in the 1990s and thereafter perceived regime survival as North Korea's supreme strategic goal, from Pyongyang's perspective, the highest policy objective was to avoid pressure and buy time and resources through a moderate foreign policy until it had secured nuclear deterrence. This strategic concept was the core of North Korea’s Military-First policy (Songun) of 1995-2011. A crucial factor behind North Korea's shift to a confrontational policy toward the U.S. and South Korea around 2008/09 and its open acceleration of nuclear and missile development was its acquisition of a credible nuclear weapon through its second nuclear test in 2009. Likewise, a key reason for North Korea's declaration of the "two hostile states" doctrine was its acquisition of at least a rudimentary tactical nuclear warfare capability around 2023. Without such development, North Korea’s threats to completely destroy, scorch, and subjugate South Korea would have lacked credibility.

The ‘Two Hostile States’ Doctrine and the Strategic Cultures of North and South Korea

From the perspective of strategic culture theory, North and South Korea embody starkly contrasting strategic cultures. North Korea’s doctrine of “two hostile states in a state of belligerence,” and the South Korean government’s response to it, demonstrate how each side's political culture affects its ongoing policy toward the other.

Regarding the North Korean side: First, the “two hostile states” doctrine is constructed utilizing the various staple elements of North Korea's strategic culture mentioned above. Second, North Korea’s doctrine of “two hostile states in a state of belligerence” can be seen as fundamentally a “stonewalling” strategy toward the South. According to Russell J. Leng, the “stonewalling” strategy, though rare, is one of the options available to a state with realist security policies. The core of this strategy is to reject all inducements offered by the adversary, while refraining from initiating any attempts to exert influence on the adversary. [4]

The party adopting “stonewalling” refuses to alter its position and makes no attempts, whether coercive or accommodating, toward the adversary. A state chooses a stonewalling strategy when its adversary maintains a hostile position and makes excessive, unacceptable demands, while the state lacks feasible means to influence the adversary to change that behavior. The state’s leader, faced with unacceptable options, may resort to inaction rather than choosing between two undesirable paths. A state also adopts a stonewalling strategy when it stalls on the decision while hoping for an improvement in the situation, including third-party intervention; when the decision-making procedure is paralyzed; or when it disregards the adversary’s proposals as unfit for bargaining and unwaveringly prepares for war. [5] …A state adopting this strategy is likely to significantly curtail the level of its foreign engagement for a long period, and its actions will be mostly confrontational and not as swift as its counterparts. [6] States choosing stonewalling are generally status-quo states with a military advantage. [7]

Though passive in foreign policy, the “stonewalling” strategy is geared to be proactive in domestic policy. Particularly, it means “creating peace by reducing contact with competitors,” [8] thereby devoting greater attention to internal development. For North Korea, this involves perfecting its society in line with “Our State First” ideology, developing the economy, and strengthening political order. Additionally, in a state of relative peace with reduced interference from South Korea, North Korea can focus on advancing its nuclear weapons arsenal without limitation. If executed effectively, the “stonewalling” strategy can completely terminate contact between conflicting parties. As Waltz describes his conception of a “withdrawal” (from international relations) strategy, “the existence of conflict is deeply felt, but if the connection between conflicting parties is severed, it becomes impossible for conflict to escalate into violence.” [9]

In light of this, four major interpretations in South Korea regarding the “two hostile states” doctrine could be misjudgments. The first interpretation assumes that the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s hardline policy toward the North was the most significant factor behind the doctrine’s emergence, and therefore, if South Korea changes its policy to be more amicable, North Korea is likely to abandon the doctrine. The second interpretation focuses on phrases such as “scorching South Korea,” “complete destruction,” and “subjugation,” and perceives the doctrine as an agenda and a prelude to an offensive (nuclear) posture and threat escalation against the South. [10] The third interpretation emphasizes the North’s rejection of the “one people, one nation” agenda and its hardline containment policy toward the South, believing that the doctrine is a product of the North’s fear of unification by absorption led by South Korea. [11] The fourth interpretation views Kim Yo Jong’s statements toward the South on July 28 and toward the U.S. on July 29 as an “attempt to seize the initiative by shaking up the board” or a product of proactive intent. [12]

As the “stonewalling” strategy is a rare choice, South Korea’s policy toward the North is similarly a rarity. It is common for a country to have multiple strategic cultures; South Korea's current North Korea policy reflects one of them. The policy’s core is to adopt a policy toward North Korea based on the principle of unilateral concessions for future gains (seon-gong-hu-deuk-ron), with the aim of establishing a gradually cooperative relationship by assuming North Korea is a benign, status-quo state and proving that South Korea is also benign. In the typology of international relations, this policy is one of appeasement. This policy could succeed if North Korea's demands are limited and if South Korea could satisfy them without incurring substantial costs. The inherent pitfall in this policy is that if one side begins to take the other's appeasement for granted, it may assume that even major provocations will go unpunished and would be tempted to intentionally escalate tensions to extract greater concessions. That is, this policy could tempt the other side to provoke on an even larger scale. Alternatively, while this policy may lower the level of tension in the immediate term, it could, during its implementation, help the adversary enhance its future provocative capabilities in an environment free from external pressure. Given that North Korean doctrine of “two hostile states” is one of “stonewalling,” the second scenario would be the more probable one, while North Korea would not positively respond to South Korean initiatives to improve relations. In any case, South Korea’s renewed unilateral conciliatory policy toward the North creates an unexpectedly optimal environment for the “stonewalling” strategy North Korea intends to pursue. Of course, while the likelihood is low, North Korea might demonstrate “strategic flexibility” by responding to renewed calls for improving inter-Korean or US-North Korea relations, attempting to gain tactical advantages in the process. ■

References

Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Leng, Russell J. Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: The Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000.

———. Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980: Realism versus Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

Scobell, Andrew. “China's Real Strategic Culture: A Great Wall of the Imagination.” Contemporary Security Policy 35, no. 2 (2014).

Snyder, Jack L. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1977.

Waltz, Kenneth. Realism in International Politics. New York: Routledge, 2008.

김진하 외. 『김정은 정권 대남전략 전환 분석』. 서울: 통일연구원, 2024.

정용수. “111일 만에 침묵 깬 김여정 ... ‘손절’인가 제안인가.” 『중앙일보』, 2025년 7월 31일.

천영우. “이재명 정부 대북 정책의 딜레마.” 『조선일보』, 2025년 7월 21일.

[1] Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University 1995), p. 36.

[2] Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 8.

[3] Andrew Scobell, “China's Real Strategic Culture: A Great Wall of the Imagination,” Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2014), p. 213.

[4] Russell J. Leng, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816-1980: Realism versus Reciprocity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 143.

[5] Ibid., p. 143.

[6] Op.cit., p. 145.

[7] Russell J. Leng, Bargaining and Learning in Recurring Crises: the Soviet-American, Egyptian-Israeli, and Indo-Pakistani Rivalries (Ann Arbor: the University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 29

[8] Kenneth Waltz, Realism in International Politics (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 35.

[9] Ibid., p. 31.

[10] 김진하 외, 김정은 정권 대남전략 전환 분석 (통일연구원, 2024).

[11] 천영우, “이재명 정부 대북 정책의 딜레마,” 조선일보, 2025.7.21.

[12] 정용수, “111일 만에 침묵 깬 김여정... ‘손절’인가 제안인가,” 중앙일보 2025.7.31.

■ Hyeongjung PARK is Independent Researcher on North Korean Affairs.

■ Edited by Inhwan OH, Senior Research Fellow; Jong Hyuk CHUNG, Research Associate, Korea National Diplomatic Academy; Kyoungnak MINN, Intern
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